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[001] Savoy1 and the abbot of Rievaulx, concerning forges in the forest of Glaisdale.]2 This
[002] is true if he does [not] withdraw himself [from the first] in good time,3 before judgment;
[003] after judgment he may not. Quaere whether one may withdraw from some of
[004] the clauses of the writ but not from others. 4We must see whether they are so connected
[005] that one may be determined without the other, and accordingly let the matter
[006] proceed or not. A writ also falls on the death of him who impetrated, or on his
[007] deposition if he is a bishop, abbot or prior or the like; but not conversely, if the bishop,
[008] abbot or prior are tenants, because the action and the writ stand until another has
[009] been substituted, especially if the action is civil and not penal. And if it is civil and
[010] penal, the action will endure with respect to the penalty and restitution as long as he
[011] who has been deposed is alive. If he dies, before deposition [or after], the penalty is
[012] extinguished with the person but [the action] will continue in the person of the
[013] substitute with respect to restitution [but by another writ].5 In a personal action the
[014] writ but not the action falls on the death of the tenant, whether it is civil or natural
[015] death; if it is civil, provided that he has not fraudulently taken leave [of the world]
[016] after impetration. The writ also falls on the death of him who ordered or commanded,
[017] the thing being still res integra. And so if one impetrates two writs for the same thing,
[018] and begins to sue both at one and the same time, on the right as well as on the possession;
[019] the action on the right is deferred and the writ is in suspense until the matter of
[020] possession has been decided, as [in the roll] of Trinity term in the fourteenth year of
[021] king Henry in the county of Surrey, [the case] of the prior of Newark.6 This is true
[022] whether the writs have been impetrated by one or two or several. And so if a woman
[023] claims dower by a writ of dower, that is, a portion of the whole, and another claims
[024] the whole in a proprietary action, the action of dower is suspended until the proprietas
[025] is settled. So if two implead one as to the same thing, using the same action and the
[026] same writ; he is preferred who first began to sue and the other writ together with the
[027] action will remain in suspense, whether it is in the same or different courts, except
[028] [if one] is in the court of the lord king, where priority is disregarded because of its
[029] superiority and dignity,7 where the rule, ‘He who first began to sue is preferred to the
[030] others’8 fails, as above [ of actions.] The writ also falls where one claims to hold of the
[031] king and the other of someone other



Notes

1. ‘Sabaudia’

2. Not in B.N.B., no roll extant; Br. became a judge coram rege in 1247: supra ii, 323 (addicio)

3. ‘si non’

4. Om: ‘Sed’

5. Supra iii, 46

6. B.N.B., no. 416; C.R.R., xiv, no. 335 (sidelined); supra ii, 320

7. Supra 279

8. D. 10.3.2.1; infra 376


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