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[001] but with16 sorrow of heart, in order to save himself and his family, since he could not
[002] otherwise escape [danger], he is not liable to the penalty for homicide. By chance,
[003] as by misadventure, when one throws a stone at a bird or elsewhere17 and another
[004] passing by unexpectedly is struck and dies,18 or fells a tree and another is accidentally
[005] crushed beneath its fall and the like. But here we must distinguish whether
[006] he has been engaged in a proper or an improper act. Improper, as where one has
[007] thrown a stone toward a place where men are accustomed to pass, or while one is
[008] chasing a horse or ox someone is trampled by the horse or ox and the like, here
[009] liability is imputed to him. But if he was engaged in a lawful act, as where a master has
[010] flogged19 a pupil as a disciplinary measure, or if [another is killed] when one was
[011] unloading hay from a cart or cutting down a tree and the like, and if he employed
[012] all the care he could, that is, by looking about him and shouting out, not too
[013] tardily or in too low a voice20 but in good time and loudly, so that if there was
[014] anyone there, or approaching the place, he might flee and save himself, or in the
[015] case of the master by not exceeding mean and measure in the flogging of his pupil,
[016] liability is not imputed to him. But if he was engaged in a lawful act and did not
[017] employ due care, liability will be attributed to him. By intention,21 as where one in
[018] anger or hatred or for the sake of gain, deliberately and in premeditated assault,
[019] has killed another wickedly and feloniously and in breach of the king's peace.
[020] Homicide of this kind is sometimes done in the sight of many bystanders, sometimes
[021] in secret, out of the sight of all, so that who the slayer is cannot be ascertained;
[022] homicide of that kind may be termed murder, as will be explained below.22
[023] The punishment for homicide is of two kinds [since homicides are of two kinds],
[024] namely, spiritual and corporal.23 24The spiritual is discharged by penance.25 One
[025] slays another in two ways, sometimes by word, sometimes by deed: by word, 26as
[026] where one dissuades another and by such dissuasion restrains him from doing the
[027] good he intended when he wished to rescue someone from death; thus in an indirect
[028] way he commits homicide. The punishment for homicide committed by deed
[029] varies; for homicide committed in doing justice, with a proper and lawful intention,
[030] no punishment is to be inflicted.27 28If one strikes a pregnant woman or gives her
[031] poison in order to procure an abortion, if the foetus is already formed or quickened,
[032] especially if it is quickened, he commits homicide.29 30Several may be guilty of
[033] homicide just as one may be, as where several have quarrelled among


16. ‘immo cum’, as Raymund: Schulz, 290; ‘in motu,’ CE, CM, LA, MG, LA, OA, OC; ‘metu,’ V, Fleta, i, ca. 23

17. ‘alibi,’ cf. Schulz 290; ‘aliud,’ LA, Y; ‘aliter,’ CM, MG, ‘animal,’ OA, V

18. Infra 384

19. ‘verberabat,’ as Raymund

20. ‘demisse,’ as Raymund

22. Infra 378-9

23. Cf. Schulz, 292

24-25. Ibid., ii, 1, 2

26-27. Ibid.

28-29. Ibid., ii, 1, 4

30-31. Raymund, ii, 1, 5

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