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[001] that the lord king and his council were deceived by a false suggestion. For the king
[002] may be deceived since he is a man, but God can never be since he is God. [If], when
[003] the lord king has been apprised of this, he persists in his intention to protect the
[004] tenant, though the injuria from then on it will be the injuria of the king himself,1
[005] since he is bound to dispense2 justice to all men, there is no one who can impose the
[006] necessity of correcting or amending it upon him unless he himself so wishes, since
[007] he has no superior except God, and it will suffice him for punishment that he await
[008] God's vengeance.3 If he imposes the necessity of rendering judgment upon his justices
[009] in this case or others like it, let them render4 it in this way, that it is not by
[010] judgment5 but because the lord king so wishes, whence it follows that the judgment
[011] is a matter of will rather than jus,6 if it can be called a judgment.7 And whatever
[012] may be said of the king's deed, that he is king and accordingly his deed must not
[013] be questioned,8 it may not be judged nor revoked by anyone when it is rightful, but
[014] if it is wrongful it will not then be the deed of the king.9 And since it is not his deed,
[015] because wrongful, it may be questioned and judged, but it cannot be amended or
[016] revoked without him.]10 And note in conclusion that contumacy and default may be
[017] excused in the absence of necessity, by will alone, since one summoned by one not
[018] his proper judge is not bound to appear.11 He is excused of default before judgment
[019] and after, when that is proved, and so if the matter proceeds [to] judgment through
[020] a false procurator, because with one not his proper judge or an unauthorized procurator
[021] the judgment is void and the controversy void.12 And so when he has no
[022] summons or an improper summons, [He need not then appear to answer the plea,
[023] only to allege and prove that the summons was void or improper.]13 And so if he
[024] has gone on a journey before the summons, not anticipated by the summons, as was
[025] said above.

If after default a love-day is taken.

[027] And finally note that if after default and before judgment a love-day is taken, [or
[028] the plea is transferred from one court to another at the instance and the prayer of
[029] the demandant, who stood to gain by the default, and it is done simply, without
[030] mention of the default, it is evident that the demandant tacitly renounces the
[031] default, and therefore he will have no


1. Supra ii, 110

2. ‘dispensare’

3. Supra ii, 33

4. ‘reddant’

5. ‘per iudicium’

6. ‘ius’; supra ii 305, iii, 184

7. Supra ii, 110

8. Supra ii, 109, 169, iv, 78; om: ‘iustum,’ ‘nec’

9. Supra ii, 305

10. Supra 71, 79

11. Supra 63

12. Tancred, 142, 276-7; Drogheda, 109; infra 246; C. 2.12.24

13. Supra 63

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