Bracton: Thorne Edition: English. Volume 3, Page 337

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Volume 3, Page 337

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[001] whether by the justice or the jurors. For a juror commits perjury because of a false
[002] oath if he wittingly swears otherwise than the matter in truth is. But if the oath is
[003] foolish, though it is false, he does not commit perjury, though in truth the matter is
[004] otherwise than he has sworn, because he swears according to conscience since he
[005] does not go against his understanding.¹ [There are some who speak the truth, but
[006] by swearing perjure themselves,² because they go against their understanding. There
[007] are others who speak a falsehood, but by swearing do not perjure themselves, since
[008] they do not lie nor go against their understanding, since they believe it to be so,
[009] according to conscience, though the matter is actually otherwise, as where one asks
[010] who was at the council of London,³ and he replies that the king and earl Richard
[011] [were], as he believes; though the truth is otherwise, that the earl was not there, he
[012] does not lie, and though he swears that it is as he believes, he does not commit perjury.
[013] Conversely, some speak truth yet lie and perjure themselves, since they go
[014] against their understanding, because they do not believe it to be as they say, as
[015] where a jew says that Christ was born of a virgin, he lies because he goes against his
[016] understanding and does not believe it to be so, though it is indeed so in truth, and if
[017] he swears he commits perjury.]⁴ Similarly, a juror may make a false judgment or⁵ a
[018] foolish one when he is bound to judge by the words of his oath, which are these:
[019] that he will speak the truth as to whether such a one disseised such a one. We must
[020] then⁶ see whether he answers simply, without giving any reason for his statement,
[021] that such a one did or did not disseise such a one, [or does not]. If [no reason is given
[022] and] the fact is otherwise, [he gives] a false judgment, if he has gone against his
[023] understanding, and a foolish pronuntiatio of the justice may follow,⁷ though not a
[024] false one, because he did not examine. Similarly, the judgment of the juror may be
[025] foolish, if he has not gone against his understanding, and similarly foolish the pronuntiatio⁸
[026] of the judge. If they say that such a one did or did not disseise such a one
[027] and give a reason for their statement, relating the truth completely,⁹ though they
[028] do not clearly judge, they do what amounts to it. And though their account does not
[029] agree with their oath and preceding verdict they do not swear a false oath, because
[030] they speak according to their conscience, [nor do they give a false judgment] though
[031] they give¹⁰ a foolish one, because they may be mistaken in their judgments just as
[032] may a judge.¹¹ If the justice decides according to their judgment he will make a false
[033] pronuntiatio.¹² If they have related

Notes

1. Supra 63

2. ‘verum dicunt sed iurando peierant’

3. Easter, 1254; Richardson in Traditio, vi, 94

4. Kuttner, Kanonislische Schuldlehre, 77 n.

5. ‘vel’

6. ‘tunc’

7. ‘sequi poterit,’ from preceding line

8. ‘pronuntiatio’

9. ‘per omnia’

10. ‘faciant’

11. Infra 341

12. Supra 58, 75