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1A grievous injuria is assessed in many ways.


 [002] an injuria may be slight or grievous.2 3In assessing damages, it is adjudged ‘grievous’
 [003] from the deed itself, as where one has been badly wounded, beaten and mistreated in
 [004] breach of the peace. Or from the place where it was committed,4 in the king's court
 [005] or a seignorial court, before the justices or in the county court before the sheriff, 5 in
 [006] a theatre, at a fair, or in a market place, or elsewhere in the presence of many people.6
 [007] 7Or from the position of the wound, as where it is on the forehead or in the eye8
 [008] rather than in a hidden part. Or from the status of the 9person concerned, as where
 [009] an injuria is done to magistrates or bailiffs, to parents or patrons.10 11Not only is
 [010] he who committed the wrong, that is, who struck the blow, liable in an actio
 [011] iniuriarum but he who maliciously aided or abetted or caused another to be struck.12

An injuria may be annulled by dissimulation.


 [013] 13This action is lost by dissimulation. Thus if a man suffers an injuria and lets it
 [014] slip from his mind at once he cannot subsequently regret his decision and recall it
 [015] to mind in order to have it punished.14

Of replevin.


 [017] The detention of a pledge taken by way of distress is a matter belonging to the
 [018] crown of the lord king and scarcely anyone is allowed to determine it save the
 [019] king himself or his justices. But since the said plea brooks no delay because of the
 [020] animals involved and the loss which might occur if they were long kept shut up,
 [021] until the plea of replevin had been determined, the sheriff is of necessity permitted
 [022] to determine a plea of this kind, not by virtue of his office as sheriff but as a justice
 [023] of the lord king.15 16<For the same reason no one may claim a liberty of this kind as
 [024] belonging to him de jure, only as a justice of the lord king and by his special grant;17
 [025] unless he has such he cannot protect himself by the exception of long use.18 When one
 [026] has such a liberty, it is of [no] importance, in connexion with whether he may have
 [027] his court as to such plea if he claims it, that the beasts have been released by the
 [028] king's writ on complaint made to the king or without the king's writ on complaint
 [029] made directly to the sheriff, since he has not been negligent in the dispensation of
 [030] justice.> Everything that may occur in connexion with this plea lies in and turns
 [031] on two points, namely the seizure and the detainer against gage and pledges.
 [032] Every seizure is either lawful or unlawful. If lawful, as where it is for service withheld
 [033] by one who acknowledges that service, he who distrains may admit the taking,

Notes

1. Inst. 4.4.9

2. Supra 290

3-4. Inst. 4.4.9; ‘Atrox,’ as Inst.

5-6. Ibid.

7-8. Ibid.

9-10. Ibid.; supra 299, infra iv, 364

11-12. Inst. 4.4.11; D. 47.10.11 pr.

13-14. Inst. 4.4.12; D. 47.10.11.1

15. Supra 332, 411, 437; infra iii, 154

16. Supra i, 390

17. Supra 59, 168, 281

18. ‘exceptione temporis longi’; supra 58, 167, 293-4

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