the prisoners each presented a "petition, complaint, and appeal" to the King 
in Council. 617 
Because it was at the moment inconvenient to hold a committee, these 
"petitions" were referred to the crown law officers to report their opinion 
thereon. 618 Two hearings by counsel were held before the crown law officers 
619 but some difficulty (very illuminating as to English administration) 
ion that the appeals mentioned in the charter 
were from judgments in die ordinary course 
of law. But as the assembly assumed the jurisdiction 
of King's Bench in this affair, erecting 
itself into a court for the trial of a criminal 
matter, it would have been decent and consistent 
to have allowed the appeal. Whether 
the matter was laid before the King by appeal 
or petition or both was irrelevant (Penn MSS, 
Smith and Moore v. Assembly, 1758-59, 175). 
William Smith, Sr., of New York, was of the 
same opinion as to the charter provision and 
could not see that it bore the least relation to the 
instant case. But as the "appeal" was sent to 
England, if counsel there should think proper 
to present it, he conceived no harm would ensue. 
Doubtless the royal ear would be open to 
the complaint of a suffering subject. But Smith 
conceived that the King would answer that 
the law had made provision in such cases, 
that his right to relieve his subjects was delegated 
to his judges and that he would direct 
the appellant to seek his redress from those 
judges (ibid., 187). David Ogden concurred as 
to the force of the charter provision, but felt 
that an application to the King by petition or 
appeal would be heard. The only objection he 
apprehended was that the method prescribed 
by the Habeas Corpus Act had not been pursued, 
which ought to have been done previous 
to such application. But this objection would 
probably be gotten over in favor of liberty 
(ibid., 161). 
01T 4 APC, Col., #351. For that of Smith see 
Penn MSS, Smith and Moore v. Assembly, 
'758-59, 195; for drat of Moore, ibid., 261. At 
a consultation Wilbraham and Forrester, counsel 
for the prisoners, declared their opinion 
against the power of the assembly to commit on 
any pretense and that that body was not invested 
widi any parliamentary privileges or 
powers but that of making laws. Therefore, 
they thought it by no means proper to consider 
the case as an appeal from a court having power 
in some cases to judge, but as a commitment 
illegal for want of power or legal authority 
(Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, May 13, 
1758 [5 MS Penn Letter Books, 1757, 304]). 
Therefore the statement of Smith's case did not 
rely upon the charter appeal provision, but insisted 
that the King himself was concerned, as 
his royal prerogative was now to be determined 
by a body admittedly not a court of 
record. Appeals lay to the King even upon 
laws passed by both legislative bodies, and it 
would be very odd if they would not lie from 
the judgment of one branch. All appeals were 
founded on some error in matter of fact or 
matter of law. If that were the case here, it 
would be extremely hard to deny application 
to the sovereign for relief. In the present case 
the assembly had established an unheard of 
jurisdiction which was not suffered to be inquired 
into; a paper had been called a libel 
when the law did not call it such, but which 
was not suffered to be disputed; then a 
sentence was given from which no appeal was 
suffered. By this doctrine the assembly might 
become absolute masters of the lives, liberties, 
and properties of every person in the province. 
For it was only necessary to do what was 
done here: resolve that they had jurisdiction 
and that the particular fact was murder, treason, 
etc., and deny an appeal (State of Smith's Case, 
26-27 [Penn MSS, Smith and Moore v. Assembly, 
1758-59, 163]). Smith also presented 
a complaint to the House of Commons {ibid., 
197). 
618 4 APC, Col., #351. The matter was referred 
to the crown law officers because it was 
inconvenient to hold a Committee (F. J. Paris 
to Wm. Allen, May 13, 1758 [9 MS Penn Official 
Corres., 1758-64, 35]). Cf. infra n. 620, 
on the suspicion of the Attorney General as to 
the reason for the reference. Riddell is unreliable 
on the conciliar course of the "petitions," 
confusing the Committee and the Board of 
Trade (Libel on the Assembly, 278, note 52). 
619 These hearings were largely devoted to 
Smith's cause, since proper proofs had not been 
sent over in Moore's cause (F. }. Paris to Wm. 
Allen, May 13, 1758, and June 10, 1758 [9 MS 
Penn Official Corres., 1758-64, 35, 36-37]). 
Counsel for petitioners showed that the House