cause appears to have made a great impression, for the General Assembly 
proceeded to consider it and the problem of its own jurisdiction and authority 
as an assembly for the determination of appeals from the General Court of 
Trials, especially relating to land titles. As a result of these deliberations certain 
conclusions were reached in February, 1711/2. It was declared in the first place 
that no authority existed for enactment of an earlier statute constituting the 
assembly a court of chancery, since no precedent existed of the English 
Parliament having constituted itself a court of chancery or any other court 
of judicature. The former act was therefore repealed, and it was declared that 
no appeals from the General Court of Trials to the assembly should be allowed. 
A regular court of chancery was to be established according to English 
methods and precedents, but appeals might still be made to the assembly 
by way of petition for relief in any matter cognizable before it. 592 
Apparently these declarations were intended chiefly for conciliar appeasement. 
Their true inwardness, to use the Puritan cliche, was concealed in the 
last clause which saved the matters "properly cognizable" before the assembly. 
What this signified was soon disclosed, because the General Assembly still 
continued to exercise appellate jurisdiction, and appeals were taken from its 
judgments to the King in Council. 593 Strangely enough, the Privy Council 
does not appear to have treated its earlier determination as establishing a policy 
to be observed in respect of Rhode Island, for in Ford v. Hodgson, appealed 
before the Privy Council in 1719, no aversion to the appellate jurisdiction of 
the General Assembly was manifested. 594 And in 1730 this jurisdiction was 
recognized in a statute which saved appeals to the General Assembly from all 
judgments of the Superior Court of Judicature in personal actions, 595 although 
appeals might still be taken to the King in Council directly from the Superior 
Court of Judicature in such actions. 596 
In Connecticut, where the lawmaking authority was well insulated against 
General Assembly see 4 Rec. Col. R. 1., 48-49. 
592 4 ibid., 136-37. This obscure passage is 
no clearer in the manuscript original; see MS 
Col. Rec. R.L, 1686-1715, 458 (R.I. State 
Archives). 
693 See Chapman v. Rouse (4 Rec. Col. R. 1., 
199-200); Ford v. Hodgson (4 ibid., 224); 
Coddington v. Lyte (MS Col. Rec. R. 1., 1715- 
29, 501) (this appeal was later withdrawn). 
In Mott v. Brenton (ibid., 228), Freebody v. 
Whipple (ibid., 229), and Brenton v. Stanton 
(ibid., 568) appeals were refused because of 
failure to satisfy minimal requirements. In 
Brinley v. Green (March, 1727/8) when an 
appeal from the Superior Court of Judicature 
to the King in Council or to the General Assembly 
was prayed, the court suspended judgment 
until the next session of the Assembly 
(MS R.I. Sup. Ct. fud. Judgment Book., 1725- 
41, 172). 
2/86/287, 306. 
595 Acts and Laws R.I. (1730), 190, 192. 
596 See Boreland v. Brenton (Sept., 1731) 
where appellants moved in vain against an 
appeal to the King in Council on the ground 
that an appeal in a personal action ought by 
the law of the colony to go to the Assembly 
(MS R.I. Sup. Ct. ]ud. Judgment Book, I 
41, 404).