countability upon the conductors of a lottery, was disallowed in 1764 as an unwarranted legislative interference. 587 Six years later there was disallowed another New Jersey act as removing from the ordinary course of justice a matter of a private nature, a mere point of law depending between individuals 588 In 1771 an amending and explanatory act of March, 1770, for the relief of insolvent debtors, was disallowed as diverting the usual course of legal proceedings 589 Two years later a fourth New Jersey act was disallowed; this act discharged from gaol a prisoner for debt, exempted his person and future effects from all legal process for a period of five years, and fixed a schedule for payment of his debts. The Board of Trade had submitted whether it was a matter becoming legislative intervention and whether it was proper to supersede the right of action which by law appertained to all creditors. 590 It will be observed that for the most part the various acts spoken of were not interferences with particular litigations, but designed to operate prospectively in lieu of ordinary jurisdiction. The question of a declaration of nullity did not in consequence arise, since apart from any issue of repugnancy to English law, no problem of rights determined or vested under the provincial acts seems to have arisen. In the instances in which there was direct interposition by the legislature in a litigation a different order of problem existed. Here, depending upon whether or not the manner of interference was in form a judicial or a legislative act, the Council was faced with making a choice between the traditional judicial reversal because the act was coram non judice or a declaration of nullity because the act was repugnant as a statute. It is to be noticed, further, that only if such legislative acts came up by way of appeal would there exist any opportunity for exercising such choice, since these acts were not viewed locally as the sort of statute that required royal approval, or were passed in jurisdictions where no such process of allowance was necessary. The early cases which came before the Council all have to do with an outright exercise of appellate jurisdiction by assemblies, and they all stem from colonies where the royal instructions did not run and where the ancient corporate tradition of a "general court" settling all matters of corporate business was very pronounced. In 1710, on appeal to the King in Council an October, 1708, decree of the General Assembly of Rhode Island was reversed on the ground that the General Assembly had no jurisdiction. 591 The order in this sB7 4 APC, Col, #567. 588 5 APC, Col, #152. 589 In his representation upon this act Richard Jackson stated "that the frequent and occasional interposition in [sic] the legislature in the cases of individuals for the purpose of stopping or diverting the usual course of legal proceedings, cannot but be attended with danger of great injustice" (5 APC, Col, #197). 590 5 APC, Col, #265. 591 Remington v. Brenton {PC 2/82/334; PC 2/83/23, 46). For the proceedings before the