countability upon the conductors of a lottery, was disallowed in 1764 as an 
unwarranted legislative interference. 587 Six years later there was disallowed 
another New Jersey act as removing from the ordinary course of justice a 
matter of a private nature, a mere point of law depending between individuals 
588 In 1771 an amending and explanatory act of March, 1770, for the relief 
of insolvent debtors, was disallowed as diverting the usual course of legal proceedings 
589 Two years later a fourth New Jersey act was disallowed; this act 
discharged from gaol a prisoner for debt, exempted his person and future 
effects from all legal process for a period of five years, and fixed a schedule for 
payment of his debts. The Board of Trade had submitted whether it was a 
matter becoming legislative intervention and whether it was proper to supersede 
the right of action which by law appertained to all creditors. 590 
It will be observed that for the most part the various acts spoken of were 
not interferences with particular litigations, but designed to operate prospectively 
in lieu of ordinary jurisdiction. The question of a declaration of nullity 
did not in consequence arise, since apart from any issue of repugnancy to 
English law, no problem of rights determined or vested under the provincial 
acts seems to have arisen. In the instances in which there was direct interposition 
by the legislature in a litigation a different order of problem existed. Here, 
depending upon whether or not the manner of interference was in form a 
judicial or a legislative act, the Council was faced with making a choice between 
the traditional judicial reversal because the act was coram non judice 
or a declaration of nullity because the act was repugnant as a statute. It is to 
be noticed, further, that only if such legislative acts came up by way of appeal 
would there exist any opportunity for exercising such choice, since these acts 
were not viewed locally as the sort of statute that required royal approval, 
or were passed in jurisdictions where no such process of allowance was necessary. 

The early cases which came before the Council all have to do with an outright 
exercise of appellate jurisdiction by assemblies, and they all stem from 
colonies where the royal instructions did not run and where the ancient corporate 
tradition of a "general court" settling all matters of corporate business 
was very pronounced. In 1710, on appeal to the King in Council an October, 
1708, decree of the General Assembly of Rhode Island was reversed on the 
ground that the General Assembly had no jurisdiction. 591 The order in this 
sB7 4 APC, Col, #567. 
588 5 APC, Col, #152. 
589 In his representation upon this act Richard 
Jackson stated "that the frequent and occasional 
interposition in [sic] the legislature in the 
cases of individuals for the purpose of stopping 
or diverting the usual course of legal proceedings, 
cannot but be attended with danger of 
great injustice" (5 APC, Col, #197). 
590 5 APC, Col, #265. 
591 Remington v. Brenton {PC 2/82/334; PC 
2/83/23, 46). For the proceedings before the