trators. 536 However, we do find a strengthening of the doctrine of judicial review in the conciliar refusal to declare an act null and void ab initio upon legislative review. But discouraging to any theory of expanding comprehension of constitutional concepts is the evident confusion in some responsible quarters as to the force of a disallowance, as opposed to a declaration of nullity. 537 HALL V. LAING In the Jamaica appeal of Hall v. Laing before the Privy Council, in 1768, it was again urged that a colonial act was null and void ab initio as passed contrary to the royal instructions. In this case appellant had ordered his English correspondent to equip a ship for an African slaving venture, the ship to touch at Jamaica for instructions as to the ultimate disposal of her cargo. When the ship arrived at Jamaica, in October, 1762, water and provisions were low, the slaves needed refreshment, and the ship required repairs. To accomplish these ends the cargo of 630 slaves was landed; since many were suffering from (that royal instructions were not binding upon the people unless adopted and confirmed by colonial acts); The Privileges of the Island of Jamaica Vindicated (1766), 29, 35, 61; Appendix, xxviii (a strenuous objection to the classification of instructions with acts of Parliament, colonial acts, and royal commissions). In a 1766 report of a Jamaica Assembly committee on the conduct of Governor Lyttleton it was stated that "he did, in the courts where he presided, introduce his Majesty's instructions to him as governor and once founded upon them his judicial determination, substituting them for law, contrary to the law of the land, and, as your committee comprehend, to the duty and oaths of all his Majesty's judges and in express violation" of 20 Edward 111, c. 1 (5 Journals Assembly Jamaica, 610). Cf. the statement at a 1765 Committee hearing upon the conduct of Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire in passing private bills without suspending clauses that, "Nothing but Necessity can justify the Governor in passing Laws without the Clause of Suspension" (WO 1/404/13). 536 Benjamin Franklin reported that Lord Granville had declared that gubernatorial instructions were not like the pocket instructions given to ambassadors to be observed at discretion as circumstances required, but that they were drawn up by learned administrators and considered and amended in the Privy Council. When they were received by the governors, they were "the law of the land" for the King was the legislator of the colonies (5 Writings of Benjamin Franklin [ed. by A. H. Smyth, 1906], 358-59). Cf. Burd Papers, Extracts from Chief Justice William Allen's Letter Book. (ed. by L. B. Walker, 1897), 129. 537 Confirmatory evidence of confusion between "repeal" and "declaration of nullity" is found in the 1765 Virginia appeal of Howlett v. Osburn. At the Committee hearing counsel felt called upon to argue that "the King's Approbation gives force to a Law passed in the Colonies ab initio—not in the power of the Crown to annull it ab initio —but only from the time the Crown signified its Disapprobation." Lord Mansfield then commented that "they all take force from passing there. The King's disapprobation is only of force from the time it is signified in the Colony, it is law there 'till then" (WO 1/404/58). For this appeal, see PC 2/110/89; PC 2/111/300, 307; and the discussion, supra, p. 512. Further evidence of confusion is found in the province of Quebec. Governor Carleton in 1767 wrote of the evils engendered by a September 17, 1764, ordinance for establishment of civil courts. To remove and to prevent such evils in futuro the governor thought the most advisable procedure was "to repeal that Ordinance, as null and void in its own nature" (1 Doc. Rel. Const. Hist. Canada, 290). For the ordinance see ibid., 205.