appellate be, who must be the administrator and defendant in the courts here and 
who, in vice, against his inclination by the act of Assembly of this province must 
be made subject to all the inconveniences which attend executors or administrators 
who are guilty of devastavits and who waste the assetts of their testators and 
intestates, by the laws of England? 323 
To this argument counsel Grindlay, for plaintiff, answered by showing, first, 
what the law had been as to estates of intestates before the Statute of Westminster 
11, c. 19; secondly, what were the duties of administrators; thirdly, 
that the act of assembly was agreeable to the laws of England. 326 More 
specifically, Grindlay argued that it was on the basis of an interpretation of 21 
Henry VIII, c. 5, that administration was granted creditors, but that this 
statute was not of force in the province. An administrator's interest was more 
confined than an executor's; executors might give preference and retain debts 
due themselves, but this power was derived from the testator's will. Administrators 
did not have that power, because their authority was derived by the 
strict letter of the law. 327 It was further argued that the provincial act in question 
settled the administration on reasonable grounds and had in view the 
construction of 21 Henry VIII, c. 5. The eighth clause of the latter act only regarded 
administrators as principal creditors and did not alter the law of England 
in any other respect. The assembly, perceiving the inconveniences arising 
from exercise of the unlimited powers given by the common law, was willing 
to repress these inconveniences. The common law being the perfection of 
reason, the act was consonant to reason by letting each creditor share in the 
assets, if insufficient to pay his whole debt. On the other hand, it was contrary 
to reason that an administrator creditor should desert the administration; 
the act made the administrator diligent and vigorous in following the trust reposed 
in him for the benefit of the creditors. Finally, administrators de bonis 
non were within the equity and meaning, although not within the letter, 
of the assembly act. 328 
On the first Tuesday in January, 1760, Chief Justice Michie delivered his 
decision. Before entering into the claim of voidness for repugnancy, the 
plaintiff's contention that the act extended to administrators de bonis non 
was upheld. 329 Then Michie examined the question whether acts of Parliament 
extended to the plantations, and on this he took the stand that the common 
colonial practice of making English statutes of force or re-enacting them 
by provincial act refuted the opinion that such statutes generally extended to 
America. The King and Privy Council were the dernier resort for all matters 
325 ibid., 229. 
327 MS Journal So. Car. Court Common Pleas, 
i 75- 6 3, 229-30. 
326 Ibid., 229. Cited in support were Hensloe's 
Case (9 Coke Rep. 36, 38b); Graysbrook v. Fox 
328 Ibid., 230. 
(1 Plowden 280); Coke, Second Inst., 397-98. 329 Ibid., 231-32.