attempt to cope with the problem merits attention as coming from a barrister 
who was experienced both in colonial courts and in London administrative 
circles. While his remedy would not have appealed to many colonial lawyers, 
the penetrating quality of his statement of the problem cannot be denied. 
NULLITY UPON LEGISLATIVE REVIEW 
During the period upon which we have just been focusing our attention, 
declaration of nullity upon legislative review suffered an eclipse as an administrative 
instrument. However, in August, 1741, the Board of Trade received 
a petition from one Nicholas Rice complaining of a North Carolina 
act which allegedly deprived petitioner of his office as clerk of the county 
court, held by royal patent. Claiming that the legislature had no power to 
vacate a grant made by the crown and passed under the Great Seal, Rice asserted 
that the act attempting this vacating was a nullity in itself and void 
ab initio, it not being a matter proper for the exercise of the legislative 
power. The petition indicates that opinion was still abroad that acts could 
be declared void ab initio in nonjudicial proceedings, but this was not an 
instance of repugnancy to the laws of England, but rather of infringement 
upon the royal prerogative and the act received the ordinary disallowance 
302 
A more important episode in the career of declarations of nullity upon 
legislative review is found some years later in respect to Massachusetts. In 
1755-56 three acts were passed in this province unilaterally dissolving the 
marriages, respectively, of Mary Clapham, Mary Parker, and John Farnum. 303 
The reason for these legislative divorces is obscure. The Governor and Coun- 
302 CO 5/296/B 56; 3 APC, Col., #559. As 
a secondary argument petitioner stated that 
such deprivative power, if it could be exercised, 
should be exercised with the greatest caution. 
"The party to be affected ought to have 
notice to defend his property and to be heard 
by council and witnesses in his defense and 
the evidence on both sides transmitted home 
as was lately done in the case of Manning's 
divorce bill from Jamaica." The Committee 
as reasons for disallowance stated: (i) no 
proof was before the assembly to support the 
preamble allegations; (2) even if the allegations 
had been made out, the proceeding was 
not justifiable as it took away the rights and 
profits of a royal patentee without any equivalent 
in lieu thereof; (3) lack of a suspending 
clause. 
SO3 The Act to dissolve the marriage of Mary 
Clapham with William Clapham, and to allow 
her to marry again, related that Mary 
had been divorced as to bed and board only 
by decree of the Governor and Council upon 
proof of William's violation of the marriage 
contract by desertion, and cohabitation and 
adultery with another woman (6 Acts and 
Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 165). The act mutatis 
mutandis for Mary Parker and Phineas Parker 
contained a relation of desertion and conviction 
of adultery (ibid., 169); the act mutatis 
mutandis for John Farnum and Elizabeth 
Farnum related that Elizabeth had been guilty 
of adultery in the judgment of the General 
Assembly (ibid., 170). For the petitions for 
the passage of the acts of Parker and Farnum, 
respectively, see 9 MS Mass. Archives (Domestic 
Relations, 1643-1774), 379, 396.