analogy does not appear to have been presented in the conciliar argument, 
and it appears to us that affirmance was the result of the full impact of the 
various legal arguments presented of which the previous confirmation of the 
1692 act was only a single though telling point. 258 
The possible effect of the royal confirmation in Philips v. Savage can 
scarcely be appraised without some inquiry into the state of current doctrine 
respecting such confirmation, a subject which affords material for much interesting 
speculation. First let us inquire into the matter of the legal force of 
a confirmed colonial law. In 1703 the Board of Trade, considering monetary 
conditions in the plantations, questioned the Attorney General whether the 
Queen by proclamation could alter the rates of foreign coins in the plantations. 
In Massachusetts a rate higher than in other colonies prevailed by virtue of 
An Act for Ascertaining the Value of Coyns Currant within This Province, 
an act which had been confirmed by the Queen in Council. 259 Northey was 
of the opinion that the confirmation having been absolute the rate established 
would continue until repealed by another act of the General Assembly, "the 
passing of an act there with the absolute confirmation of Her Majesty having 
the force of an Act of Parliament made in England." 260 If Northey's position 
is correct, the Privy Council, had it declared the Massachusetts act null and 
void ab initio upon appeal, would have been declaring void an act having the 
force of a parliamentary enactment. And despite the statements in Bonham's 
or disaffirmed as unlawful by the law. The sole 
benefit which the corporation obtains by such 
allowance is, that they shall not incur the 
penalty of mentioned in the Act, if they 
put in use any ordinances which are against 
the King's prerogative, or the common profit of 
the people, etc." See also The Stationers in 
the City of London v. Salisbury (Comb. 221), 
where to the assertion of counsel that "this 
by-law was signed by die Lord Chancellor 
Finch," the court replied, " 'Tis never the 
better for that, for that is done of course. So 
we use to do in the circuits, but if the orders 
be not good, let the parties look to that at their 
peril." Compare Lord Ellesmere that "the true 
meaning of the statute of 19 H. 7 was that 
such ordinances made by corporations and allowed 
by the great judges of the realm should 
stand confirmed by Act of Parliament" (Observations 
on Lord Coke's Reports [n.d.], 
12). Cf. Davenant v. Hurdis (Moore K.B. 
576); Norris v. Staps (Hobart 210). 
- 5S Although counsel for the province was not 
heard, Wilks was of the opinion that without 
provincial intervention success would have been 
doubtful; as a private cause the appeal would 
not have been as well attended or considered 
(52 MS Mass. Archives [Letters, 1724-38], 
465). Wilks had been with "most of the Lords 
that attended the Council that night and apprized 
them of the consequence and engaged 
their attendance. My Lord President was 
pleased not to appoint the hearing till my Lord 
Chancellor could attend." 
259 CSP, Col., 1702-3, #656. For the act see 
1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 296. 
260 CSP, Col., 1702-3, #765. Solicitor General 
Raymond also stated later that acts of 
colonial assemblies were "of the same effect 
there, as an Act of Parliament here" (ibid., 
1712-14, #457). Cf. the statement of Holt, 
C. J., that "every by-law is a law, and as 
obligatory to all persons bound by it, that is, 
within its jurisdiction, as any Act of Parliament, 
only with dris difference, that a by-law 
is liable to have its validity brought in question, 
but an Act of Parliament is not; but 
when a by-law is once adjudged to be a good 
and reasonable by-law, it is to all intents as 
binding to drose that it extends to as an Act 
of Parliament can be" (City of London v. 
Wood [12 Mod. 669, 678]). Perhaps the