it had received confirmation by the King in Council. Furthermore, the confirmation was made by those who had granted the 1691 charter to the colony and who were indisputable judges as to conformity to the charter. 230 This confirmation was augmented by five additional or explanatory acts which had been expressly or tacitly approved by the King in Council. 231 To this argument appellant answered that if the law were void, the confirmation added nothing to its validity. 232 Next, it was attempted to show that the act was not repugnant to the laws of England. Admitting that the colony rule differed from primogeniture (the general rule governing descents in England), respondent pointed out that many customs prevailed in the mother country which were repugnant to the general rule. Yet the legality of such customs as gavelkind and borough English was never questioned, although circumstances did not afford the same justification for such deviation as in newly settled countries. So, as rules of descent varied and conflicted in England, it was impossible but that the rule of descent in America should vary from one rule or other in England. 233 The similarity of the Massachusetts rule of descent to gavelkind was urged at the hearing. 234 Assuming for forensic purposes that these arguments failed and that the repugnancy of the act was established, a new line of argument was taken by counsel. It was insisted that in the charter there were no clauses restrain- 230 5 Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 72. The act was confirmed by an Order in Council of August 22, 1695 {PC 2/76/195). 231 5 Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 72-73. Two acts receiving actual confirmation were Chapter 46 of the laws of 1692-93 (1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass, hay, 101), confirmed at the same time as the main act (PC 2/76/195) and Chapter 2 of the laws of 1730-31 (2 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 579), confirmed by a January 27, 1731/2, Order in Council (3 APC, Col, p. 845). The reliance placed upon the language of the confirming orders was without significance, since such language was the formal style for such category of conciliar orders. Three acts received tacit approval in that they were neither disallowed nor confirmed within the three year period specified by the charter (see 3 Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, 1883). These acts were Chapter 2, Laws of 1710-11 (1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 652), Chapter 24, Laws of 1715-16 (2 ibid., 31), Chapter 10, Laws of 1719-20 (2 ibid., 151). Cf. 2 Talcott Papers, 80. 232 Notes from the Lee MS read: "If law void the confirmation nil valet 295 [Coke's] Inst. A confirmation only makes good a voidable estate. 301. "5 Co\e 56a. King's grants shall not issue to 2 purposes. "If King grants lands to villein does not infranchise yet it would in case of a common person." 233 5 Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc, 79. 234 It appears that it was asserted: "That [law] is not contrary to the laws of England which law allows and the laws of England allow of lands being divided as here. [Marginal citations, 1 Inst. 175, 140 a] Judges must take notice of custom of gavelkind by which case all brothers divide by custom. Britton 187b. Lands partible between brothers and sisters by custom. Hale, folio 220, lands descended to sons and daughters" (Lee MS). The further point was made that "gavelkind is a socage tenure. Charter is that lands should not be [held] by knight service but by common socage. 2 Anderson 115" (ibid.). On the charter tenure, see 3 Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, 1870. It was, however, noticed that "this law differs from gavelkind in the extent" (Lee MS). Under gavelkind the estate was partible among the sons equally (Robinson, The Common Law of Kent; or, The Customs of Gavelkind [1741], 90-91); the double share to the