law of England did not extend to the plantations without an act of assembly, 
it was contended for the colony that accordingly descents should be governed 
by the law of natural equity. Therefore, a declarative act should be passed 
that the law of natural equity ought to govern administrations until the time 
when a rule agreeable to common law would be settled. 198 But in an exposition 
of the difference between the extension of the common and statutory 
laws of England to the plantations Wilks corrected the colony view of the 
recent opinion of the law officers that had been made with reference to acts 
of Parliament passed subsequent to the first settlement and not with reference 
to the common law. 199 The agent then went on to demonstrate that there 
was no inconsistency in the approval of a Connecticut act settling intestate 
estates of personalty, although contrary to an act of Parliament, and the annulment 
of a similar act governing realty, as contrary to the common law of 
England. 200 While certain quarters at this time still advocated action in 
Parliament and minimized the danger of an explanatory charter, 201 Wilks, 
convinced that relief was unobtainable except upon such condition, let the 
colony petition rest. 202 
THE RHODE ISLAND PRECEDENT 
While these attempts were being made by Connecticut to avoid the effects 
of Winthrop v. Lechmere, another cause came before the King in Council 
which claims our interest. This cause was an appeal from Rhode Island 
which involved the validity of a partition made according to a colony custom 
that was contrary to the laws of England. In September, 1729, Ann Sabeere 
et al. brought an action for partition in the Superior Court of Judicature of 
Rhode Island against Daniel Sabeere. The plaintiffs were the heirs of John 
Sabeere who had been joint tenant with defendant of the lands in question. 203 
The defendant relied upon the doctrine of survivorship of the laws of England 
204 the plaintiffs upon "the ancient standing custom in the colony whereby 
actment was necessary (ibid., 293). 2ai See Coke, First Institute, 181 a. 
200 Ibid., 274-75. Yet Wilks thought it proper