It was contended that since there was no charter provision directing that the laws of the colony be laid before the King in Council for approbation or disallowance, there was no way to avoid laws but by seeing whether they were agreeable to the powers of the charter. If not thus agreeable, they could not be considered as laws at all, since a formal repeal of such laws could be had only by voiding the charter. 121 Then it was anticlimactically argued that the law was not only contrary to the charter, but it conflicted with other laws of the province. l 22 Another point pressed throughout was the manifest intent of the intestate and his brother that appellant should succeed to the entire realty. 123 On information that respondents would place reliance upon Palmes v. Winthrop, the earlier conciliar appeal, appellant distinguished the instant case from the proceedings in the earlier cause. 124 Upon this argument appellant prayed for relief in sevenfold form. 125 On December 20 the Committee continued the hearing of the appeal and respondent counsel were called in and heard. 120 It is possible to give only a brief account of this argument, pieced out from scattered sources, and it may here be remarked that the case was not capably handled by respondent's counsel. 127 As to the application of Lechmere to the assembly it was argued 121 Ibid., 488. This contention of appellant is inaccurate. By an October 11, 1705, Order in Council a Connecticut act directed against Quakers was disallowed as being contrary to the liberty of conscience indulged to dissenters by the laws of England, as likewise to the charter of the colony (2 APC, Col., p. 832). The disallowance was upon representation of the Board of Trade following complaint of the Quakers; see CSP, Col, 1704-5, #1060, 1100, 1153, 1200, 1356, 1362; JCTP, 1704-8/9, 141, 165. In the neighboring colony of Rhode Island, which also lacked a charter provision providing for legislative review, an act relating to the admiralty jurisdiction was disallowed upon recommendation of the Board of Trade in January, 1703/4 (CSP, Col., 1704-5, #23. 51). The Board of Trade had questioned the Attorney General whether passage of the act might not be a ground for forfeiture of the charter, "there being no reservation of power in the crown by the charter of that colony for repealing the acts made by them" (ibid., 1702- 3, #1348). Attorney General Northey advised only an expression of the royal displeasure, since the act was provisional until such pleasure was known (ibid., #1415)- Yet & e contention of appellant is supported by a 1733 Board of Trade representation to the House of Lords; see 2 Talcott Papers, 447. 1 22 6 Winthrop Papers, 488-90. 123 Ibid., 442-45, 491. 124 Ibid., 492-94. For discussion of the earlier case see supra, pp. 140-41. 125 Appellant prayed: (1) that the resolve o£ the General Assembly of May, 1725, be declared null and void; (2) that the inventory of personalty tendered the Court of Probates by appellant be ordered accepted; (3) that the Superior Court sentence granting Lechmere administration be reversed, and Lechmere's action dismissed; (4) that the administration granted Lechmere be vacated, and the administration granted appellant be ordered to stand; (5) that the inventory and account exhibited by Lechmere be vacated; (6) that the General Assembly order empowering Lechmere to sell the realty and the order of the Superior Court thereon be declared null and void; (7) that all Lechmere had done under the administration, together with the law for settling intestate estates, be declared void (ibid., 491-92). 126 pc 2/90/195. Willes and Booth were counsel for respondents (6 Winthrop Papers, 494- 95)- 127 2 Talcott Papers, 136; 13 Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc. (Ist ser.), 100; MS Conn. Archives, 2 Misc., #313- Lechmere may have intended to rely upon the talents and influence of his brother, Lord Lechmere, quondam Attorney General (see 6 Winthrop Papers, 404), but the latter died six months before the appeal was