position of the assembly was "very partial and unjust." Thirdly, that the 
assembly's resolution was unjust in that it set aside the determination of a 
court and coerced that court to come to a new determination, not warranted 
by law, in an ex parte manner. Fourthly, that this unprecedented assembly 
action altered the general law and the settled methods of justice. 114 As to the 
various court proceedings, it was contended that the letters of administration 
and the bond made no mention of realty; therefore the Court of Probates 
acted erroneously in not receiving the proffered inventory which admittedly 
was complete as to the personalty. Appellant Winthrop had duly discharged 
his duties as administrator; yet even if not so discharged, relief was not to be 
obtained in such unprecedented manner. Claims as to realty were triable at 
law and in no way affected administration. The granting of letters of administration 
and taking bond by the Superior Court was illegal and unprecedented, 
the matter properly belonging to the Court of Probates. The letters of administration 
granted to Lechmere and the bond taken from him did not extend 
to realty, and hence the inventory exhibited by Lechmere ought not to 
have been received, as it consisted wholly of realty. Further, the authorization 
of Lechmere to sell lands of the intestate was against the common and statute 
law of England, destructive of the liberty and property of the subject, against 
reason and as such, contrary to the royal charter of the province. 115 
Next, attention was centered on the act for settlement of intestate estates 
upon which it was asserted respondents rested their whole case. In the first 
place it was contended that the act was obsolete. 116 If not obsolete, it was then 
insisted that the act was void as unwarranted by the charter. By this instrument 
the legislative power was confined to making laws which were wholesome 
and reasonable and not contrary to the laws of England. 117 By the common 
law of England upon intestacy all realty descended to the eldest son of 
the intestate. It was urged in addition that under the charter the soil was 
held of the King as of the manor of East Greenwich in the county of Kent 
in free and common socage; therefore an estate of inheritance should descend 
according to the common law. 118 The common law of England prevailed in 
114 Ibid., 476-78. 
115 Ibid., 479-85. Minor points advanced were 
that the Superior Court's allowing Lechmere to 
sell land to answer costs when he only 
demanded was unjust and illegal 
and that Lechmere's suits against appellant for 
rents and profits of the realty in question were 
unjust and vexatious. 
116 It was asserted that the act was made in 
the infancy of the province and was long since 
out of use or regard; further, that there was 
not the least proof by Lechmere that the act 
was in force or practiced at the present time 
in Connecticut {ibid., 486-87). 
117 See 1 Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, 
533. 
118 6 Winthrop Papers, 487-88. The counter 
contention has been made that this tenure 
clause in the charter extended gavelkind, the 
custom of Kent, to the colonies. See citations 
collected by Morris, Studies in the History of 
American Law (1930), 106. It has been advanced 
that this contention is untenable, since 
die charter expressly defined the tenure as