colonial administration was reorganized. In 1674 an appeal came before the 
Committee for the Affairs of Jersey and Guernsey which involved the law of 
Guernsey. Upon report to the Council it was laid down that "the King does 
disallow of the rule upon which the sentence was given, it being against common 
right to condemn and give sentence against minors and infants upon 
pretence of laches or default by themselves or their guardians." 22 Repugnancy 
to the laws of England proper was no criterion in the case of Channel Islands 
law and custom, hence the determination in this case obviously rests upon the 
premise that basic English standards of justice must in any event prevail, and 
laws or decisions counter thereto were void. 
The Statute 7 & 8 William 111, c. 22, said nothing respecting the delicate 
question as to where the power to declare plantation laws null and void was 
to be lodged. Since the Council under the last Stuarts had been disallowing 
laws and since there existed also the Channel Islands precedent for judicial 
declaration of nullity, it was probably expected that the Privy Council would 
execute this statute. In any event, to give effect to this statute, the trade instructions 
to colonial governors from 1697 onward directed such officers not to 
make or to allow any laws, by-laws, usages, or customs repugnant to certain 
acts of Parliament (with which they were directed to familiarize themselves) 
in so far as these related to the plantations or repugnant to any law thereafter 
made in so far as it related to the plantations. All such laws, by-laws, usages, 
or customs in any wise repugnant to such laws were to be declared "illegal, 
null, and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever." 23 This direction was 
obviously not limited to governors acting in their judicial capacity. Further 
acts of Parliament were passed in 1751,1763, and 1766 declaring null and void 
22 In Gosselin v. Gosselin appellant petitioned 
the Council complaining that his mother suing 
in his name for an inheritance was adjudged to 
silence as being too late in her demand and 
prayed that the sentence be declared null as 
given against an undefended infant (PC 
2/63/228 [April 26, 1672]). The Committee 
for the Affairs of Jersey and Guernsey, to which 
the matter was referred, found true the petitionary 
allegations of fact and considering that 
sentences given against undefended infants 
were ipso jure null and void and that it was 
common right to relieve infants, advised that 
the petition be admitted by the Council Board. 
It was thereupon ordered by the King in Council 
that the petition be admitted and the 
sentence be set aside; that the infant appellant 
be allowed by the Royal Court to claim the 
succession and to produce his evidence, despite 
any laches by his mother, unless that court 
showed cause to the contrary within forty days 
of notice (PC 2/63/250 [May 24, 1672]). 
On July 17, 1674, after the answer of the Royal 
Court had been referred to the Committee for 
the Affairs of Jersey and Guernsey and counsel 
heard thereon, report was made by the Committee. 
Whereupon the King in Council declared 
that the Royal Court was not to blame, 
since the island law had been followed, but the 
King disallowed the rule upon which die 
sentence was given, and the sentence was then 
ordered vacated; the infant was to be allowed 
to demand the right to succession to realty and 
personalty despite any laches, and respondent 
was to account for appellant's share of the 
estate of Josuah Gosselin (PC 2/64/260). 
23 2 Labaree, Royal Instructions, #1053. For 
the acts of which the governors were to inform 
themselves see ibid., #1035.