Fowles and Ritchie v. Nanton. 20& Respondents argued that the instant case was distinguishable in that the Vice-Admiralty Court was the only court established in Newfoundland. As the clause would include the Vice-Admiralty Court without any forced construction, such inclusive interpretation should be given to prevent failure of enforcement. 210 The Committee apparently accepted the contentions of respondents, for the sentence was affirmed. 211 The Privy Council was also called upon to adjudicate the force of acts of Parliament in restraining admiralty jurisdiction in prize causes. In 1741 appeals were taken from the issuance of prohibitions by the New York Supreme Court in Pearse v. Cummins and in Pearse v. Key and Hubbard. These cases concerned November, 1739, seizures by Captain Vincent Pearse in H.M.S. Flamborough of the ships Canary Merchant and Restoration in New York harbor, under authority of a July 10, 1739, Order in Council to seize all vessels or goods of the King of Spain, of his subjects, or of others inhabiting within any Spanish territories. The ships were informed against in the New York Vice-Admiralty Court. 212 The owners entered what were essentially pleas to the jurisdiction, that the Vice-Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction of seizures made within the body of the county and city of New York and that the owners were British subjects, born in Ireland. 213 When these pleas were overruled, 21 * 209 Case of Appellant, Add. MS, 36,218/236- 37. For Ritchie v. Nanton, a 1759 appeal from the Antigua Vice-Admiralty Court, see PC 2/106/403, 454. 210 Add. MS, 36,218/238-39 211 PC 2/110/176, 193. 212 NYHR Parch., 217-B-3. 213 Ibid. Robert Auchmuty, in a January 15, 1742/3, opinion in Pearse v. Cummins, noted that one part of Cummins' plea sounded like a plea to the jurisdiction (that the seizure was made in the County and City of New York), another an issuable plea to the merits (that the owner was a British subject). He stated that die record industriously concealed die manner of offering the plea and its nature, but it appeared that the plea was given as a plea to the jurisdiction, viz., the plea to the jurisdiction was overruled and a respondeas ouster insisted upon (N.Y. State Lib. MS, A 2704). Joseph Sharpe observed, on the proceedings in the Vice-Admiralty Court, that respondent's pleas were manifestly to the jurisdiction. If matters of a nonjurisdictional nature were also overruled, it was the fault of respondent for mixing incompatible and inconsistent pleas. Under proper pleading, matter to the merits could be offered after a plea to the jurisdiction was overruled (ibid., A 2693). Key and Hubbard annexed to their "answer" the register of the Canary Merchant, a Mediterranean pass, and depositions that reclaimants were British subjects and owners of the ship, that the ship was provided with the aforesaid register and pass, and that the seizure took place within the body of the county {William Livingston MS Boo\ of Precedents, N.Y. State Lib. MS, 1329/276-87). John Chambers, for the reclaimants, stated that the substance of the pleas to be argued was that at the time of seizure both ships were lying within the body of the City of New York, not on the high seas, and that this would be proved by testimony. The question was whether if the matters of fact were true, the court could legally proceed to any further hearing. Since the law arose from tire facts, the matters of fact set forth in the plea must be allowed to be true. If informant thought the plea good, but not true, he might take issue upon it and proceed to proof, citing Practical Register in Chancery, 282. Furthermore, pleas to the jurisdiction need not be upon oath, citing ibid., 274. The truth of the fact was proved by the oath of one Alexander Forbes (N.Y. State Lib. MS, 9885/436 [John Chambers MSS'\). 214 For the proceedings in the Vice-Admiralty Court see 1 MS Mins. Vice-Adm. Ct. Prov. N.Y., 1715-46, 1 10-12, 114-16.