The petition and appeal was referred to the Committee in March, 1741/2. 206 
Before the Committee, counsel Ryder and Forrester for appellant argued that 
the general jurisdiction of the admiralty courts in the plantations had been 
altered by several acts of Parliament to give general cognizance to forfeitures 
under the Navigation Acts. This jurisdiction extended to cases not cognizable 
in the English admiralty courts in order to remedy the want of a Court of 
Exchequer; the restraining statutes relied upon by respondent were only intended 
to restrain encroachments on the common law jurisdiction in England. 
Any deprivation of the colonial admiralty courts of this jurisdiction would 
be fatal to enforcement of the Navigation Acts. As to the language of 15 
Charles 11, c. 7, it was argued that the juxtaposition of suits "in any of his 
Majesty's courts" in the plantations or "in any Court of Record in England" 
indicated the former category to be more inclusive than the latter. The "essoin, 
protection, or wager of law" clause was confined to the latter alternative clause. 
Since by subsequent act (23 Charles 11, c. 26) admiralty courts in the plantations 
were empowered to judge forfeitures, the general words of the present 
act should be construed in the same sense and in conformity to subsequent 
practice. 207 However, the Committee advised affirmance as was accordingly 
ordered on March 23, 1742/3. 208 Presumably the rationale of affirmance was 
that the clause "in any of his Majesty's courts" of 15 Charles 11, c. 7, did not 
include plantation vice-admiralty courts. 
Some years later, in the 1763 appeal of Hearn v. Gapper and Young, the 
question was raised whether the Newfoundland Vice-Admiralty Court was 
included within the meaning of the phrase "in any of his Majesty's courts" of 
15 Charles 11, c. 7, s. 6. Appellant relied upon the precedent of Kennedy v. 
(volume in reverse). For the assignment of 
errors and respondent's plea of in nullo erratum 
est, see James Alexander MSS, Box 45. James 
Alexander, for appellant, urged that the place 
of seizure was irrelevant. Respondent's argument 
was equivalent to saying that where a 
felony was committed at Albany and the felon 
taken in New York, the prisoner must be tried 
in tile latter place. The language of 15 Charles 
11, c. 7, only required suit "in any of his 
Majesty's courts," which included the admiralty 
court. No record remains of co-counsel Joseph 
Murray's argument. William Smith, Sr., counsel 
for respondent, argued that the clause "in 
any of his Majesty's courts" meant only common 
law courts as appeared from the essoin, 
etc. clause and the mention of juries in 7 and 
8 William 111, c. 22. Further, the admiralty 
court was always referred to as the "King's 
Court of Admiralty." No part of the colony 
being outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, an act of Parliament was necessary to 
give the Admiralty jurisdiction therein, citing 
Hobart 79. No act having been shown to give 
jurisdiction within the body of the county, the 
admiralty court possessed no jurisdiction, citing 
2 Coke, Inst., 229; 2 Lilly, Abr., 389, r2O; 
1 ibid., 370-71. As in England, the counties 
were never subject to admiralty court jurisdiction 
(Kennedy v. Fowles, argument in error; 
James Alexander MSS, Box 45). 
206 PC 2/97/107, 
207 Drafts of appellant's case, N.Y. State Lib. 
MS, A 2705. 
208 PC 2/97/314, 345. For a later New York 
cause of the same nature see Hough, Reports of 
Cases in the Vice-Admiralty oj the Province 
of New York., 181-83.