vice had been introduced by statute (e.g., Pennsylvania), 181 the Virginians 
sought their own solution. In 1734 it was there enacted that tenants in tail 
could dock the entail of separate parcels of land if upon inquisition or a writ 
of ad quod damnum a particular parcel was found not to exceed ,£2OO sterling 
in value. It was further provided that deeds conveying lands, following a return 
that the land did not exceed should be acknowledged before the 
General Court. 182 In Howlett v. Osburn, a 1765 appeal from Virginia, the 
Lords Committee undertook to interpret this act and to pass upon the effect of 
a later (1749) provincial statute which was unconfirmed by the crown at the 
time the action in this cause was begun. Here a first writ ad quod damnum 
had issued in October, 1736, and the premises in question had been valued at 
But in the following July upon a second writ the land was returned as 
valued at £150. The entail was accordingly docked, and a conveyance was 
made. The deed was only acknowledged before a county court. But the 1749 
act was retroactive and made valid all deeds acknowledged before such county 
courts. The question presented upon appeal was whether or not the entail 
had been lawfully docked and a valid conveyance made as a consequence 
of the second writ. 183 
Appellant contended that an unsuccessful attempt to dock the entail was 
no bar to further attempts. Respondent was disposed to regard the first inquisition 
as conclusive as if it were a finding of law, but failed to press the 
obvious point of policy that appellant's interpretation would permit a continuous 
stream of writs until a satisfactory return was found. Respondent 
argued further that the act of 1749 was of no force until confirmed by the King 
in Council. Both of respondent's contentions were rejected by the Committee, 
and the appellant's view of the cause was sustained. 184 This case is of interest, 
for it exhibits an unexpected liberality toward a method of docking entails 
that was alien to domestic jurisprudence. Of no less interest are the words 
of Lord Mansfield on the matter of the vigor of colonial acts: 
They all take force from passing there. The King's Disapprobation is only of force 
from the time it is signified in the Colony —it's a Law there 'till then. The King's 
Approbation need not be notified —because it takes effect of course. They can't 
find usage contrary to positive law. The Inquisition is not traversable. 185 
Our final example of the attitude toward colonial acts relates to a Rhode 
Island statute of 1714/5 for the registration of deeds and conveyances. For "the 
preventing clandestine and uncertain Sale of Houses and Land" it was pro- 
181 4 APC, Col., p. 116. 
iB4 PC 2/111/300, 307. 
185 W0 1/404/58. 
i B2 4 Herring, Stat, at Large Va., 397, 400. 
183 See the "cases" of the parties, Add. MS, 
36,219/273-78.