From this judgment Jeake took a writ of error to the Court of Errors, 
where judgment was reversed in November, 1763. 173 The reversal was 
grounded upon the opinion that the acts made judgments upon informations 
conclusive generally without confinement to parties or privies. 174 From this 
judgment an appeal was taken to the King in Council and entered in July, 
1764. 175 Upon argument before the Committee the appellant insisted that 
the information could operate only as an estoppel against the claims of persons 
as heirs of Sir Thomas Lynch; that at the time of the information the 
lands were vested in Thomas King and his devisee; and that appellant claiming 
under such devise was not estopped from an ejectment action. 170 Respondent, 
however, contended that the judgment upon the information could 
not be set aside upon a collateral action. Further, Philadelphia King, who succeeded 
to the lands as heir of Sir Thomas Lynch and was possessed thereof 
at the time of the information was sufficiently described in the information, 
so that the judgment thereon was a perpetual bar to her right and to the 
derivative right of appellant. 177 
Following argument, Lord Mansfield in delivering the opinion of the 
Committee upheld the contentions of the respondent. The Jamaica acts were 
to be considered, not as penal laws, but as beneficial and remedial acts. The 
informations were proceedings in rem, and it might have been more correct 
to have called upon the heir or assignee of Sir Thomas Lynch, but the information 
contained a sufficient description. If it were necessary to describe 
and ascertain the owner, it would be within the power of such owner by 
secret conveyances to prevent such description and ascertainment. Since this 
was a proceeding by proclamations in rem, the court ought to allow the 
claimants to come in after judgment, but the same parties could not controvert 
the judgment in a collateral action. 178 Therefore, it was advised that the judg- 
instance of any bystander, and if the construction 
should be made that it amounted to an 
appearance of the party and conclude him, it 
would open the door to informers themselves 
to cause the entry to be made to strengthen a 
fraudulent or deceitful information, and as to 
what had been said and strongly relied on, that 
the Acts make a judgment upon an information 
a bar to all former patents grants and claims 
whatsoever, that can be only construed to 
operate against parties and privies, and to this 
information Sir Thomas Lynch and his heirs 
were the only parties or privies and the devisee 
of Thomas King could not be bound, and if 
the contrary construction had been intended 
by the legislature, or could legally be made, 
the acts with respect to the proclamations 
would have followed the mode of the English 
laws respecting fines which give a term of 
years to all but parties and privies to claim, 
therefore the Court gave judgment for the 
plaintiff unanimously." 
173 Case of Appellant, ibid., 168-73 
"' 4 Ibid., 193. 
175 PC 2/110/509. 
176 Case of Appellant, Add. MS, 36,219/168- 
73- 
177 Case of Respondent, ibid., 177—83. 
178 Lord Mansfield declared that "the Appellants 
title was derived by mesne conveyances 
from Sir Thos. Lynch, who was on all hands 
agreed to have been seized in 1684, and it must 
be presumed he was so seized by Grant from 
the Crown, and upon payment of certain quit