cases in which slaves were disposed of by themselves and those in which they were disposed of together with lands. In the instant case the devise had been, not of slaves alone, but of slaves together with land to the same uses. This the later act had declared to be the true policy and intent of the 1705 statute. Consequently the 1727 statute could never be construed to defeat the devise; rather did it confirm and establish it. 158 Although appellants' argument was built around a sort of "plain meaning" interpretation, it is apparent that even by such a test the act of 1705 could hardly be strained to cover devolution by devise. The Lords Committee, in advising affirmance, rejected this strained construction in favor of the obvious statutory intent. 159 No notes of the Committee's opinion appear to have been made, but six years later Burwell v. Johnson is referred to by counsel on each side in a cause which came before the Virginia General Court. Blac\well v. Wilkinson involved the question whether an entail of slaves not annexed to land and made between the years 1705 and 1727 was good. 160 Attorney General Randolph, for the plaintiff, asserted that in Bunnell's case "the circumstance of the slaves being annexed to lands was, as I can say from good authority, never taken into consideration in England; they were considered as if they had been entailed separately; and it was expressly declared that the Act of 1727 should not be retrospective." George Wythe, for defendant, came up with a different version: Burwell and Johnson is cited against us, because slaves were there adjudged to be entailable under the Act of 1705. But in that case lands were devised in the same clause and by the same words with slaves, and it was always held that things annexed to lands might be entailed, as charters, covenants to warrant, etc. But moreover, the thirteenth clause of the Act of 1727 confirms the annexations of slaves to land before that Act. Wythe's version of the Privy Council's determination is probably the correct one, since it is the substance of the winning argument, but neither he nor Randolph had a really manageable citation. Indeed, the uncertainties of counsel regarding the exact grounds on which the appeal was decided is a pointed example of how the possible function of the Privy Council as a molder of legal doctrine was frustrated by the failure of adequate reporting. Shortly after Burwell v. Johnson, another Virginia statute was up before the Council Board. In Tabb et al. v. Edmundson et al. (1763) the event of the appeal depended upon interpretation of a 1705 act for the distribution of intestate estates. This statute provided that if after the death of a father, any of his 158 Case of Respondent, Add. MS, 36,218/142- 15s PC 2/109/130, 168. 43- 160 Jefferson, Reports, 73.