which he had received as a part of Frances' marriage settlement, and for this and other reasons there appears to have been some dispute about the estate. Finally the widow, while still sole, executed an agreement with remainderman Thomas Bray by the terms of which certain lands and slaves were allotted her in satisfaction of her dower in the entailed properties. It was not until after Frances had married Lewis Burwell that she obtained enlightenment as to her possible rights under the 1705 statute. Husband and wife brought an action of detinue against Thomas Bray for the entailed slaves. The latter exhibited his bill in chancery and obtained an injunction. Upon Thomas' death, the detinue action having thereby abated, Burwell and wife, in October, 1751, brought a bill in chancery against Philip Johnson and his wife Elizabeth (daughter and heir of Thomas Bray) to compel delivery of the slaves, on the ground that under the act of 1705 slaves could not be entailed. This bill was dismissed by the General Court in April, 1758. 155 An appeal to the King in Council was entered in April of the following year. 156 The appeal was argued in March, 1762. Yorke and Pratt, who appeared for appellants, contended that the act of 1705 only made slaves realty for certain purposes and required that they should always descend in fee simple. This had been done because there were no fines, recoveries, acknowledged deeds, or other methods in Virginia to bar entails, but solely acts of assembly, a very expensive process. Any other legislative course would have been ruinous to a man who might need to sell a slave because of pressing necessity. It was also asserted that the later act of 1727 could not have retrospective force. A devise made before that act limiting an estate tail in negroes "must be construed as vesting the whole Ownership on which no Remainder can be limited unless it be restrained to take Effect within a particular Time or within the Compass of a Life or Lives in being as in case of Personal Property, or of estates granted or devised in Fee on which a Remainder in Fee cannot be limited." 157 De Grey and Forrester for respondents, by carefully ignoring the words "fee simple" in the 1705 act and concentrating upon the words "land of inheritance," insisted slaves could be disposed of by deed or devise like any real estate and consequently could be entailed, which was agreeable to the usage of the several American plantations. The words of the will were sufficient to create an estate tail in James and a remainder over in Thomas Bray. They put nothing on the act of 1727, which they conceded did not "affect the present case ex post facto." The intent of this act was to create a distinction between 155 Case of Appellant, Add. MS, 36,218/138- 157 Case of Appellant, Add. MS, 36,218/138- 41. 41. 153 PC 2/106/487.