Thomas Watkins made a good appointment to charitable uses within the intent, 
meaning, and equity of 43 Elizabeth, c. 4. 90 Chief Justice Willes, in giving 
his opinion in the cause on March 1,1753, declared that the case was not within 
43 Elizabeth, c. 4; Willes was not very certain in his opinion, but thought that 
the devises were not for charitable uses. But it was plain to the Chief Justice 
that the statute did not extend to Antigua, since it could not be executed in 
that island for want of proper officers. The plantation not having received the 
act, it could not at that time be supposed to be in force. 91 Both decrees were 
accordingly ordered reversed, and the information was dismissed. 92 
It is unfortunate that more exact notes on Willes' opinion were not made. 
His objections to the lack of charitable purpose is hardly in accordance with 
the liberal policy of the Chancery with reference to the list in 43 Elizabeth, c. 4, 
and was, perhaps, induced by the testator's unfortunate reference to defense. 
For shortly before Watkins' death, Antigua, made vulnerable by absentee 
ownership, had sought to secure additional white settlers to strengthen the 
island defenses, a matter which had been before the English authorities and 
of which Willes was in a position to be aware. He may consequently have 
regarded the reference to "reduced" families as beside the testator's real purpose. 

This objection did not apply to the question of statutory extension. The 
suggestion that the act could not apply "for want of proper officers" seems to 
us specious. The issue was really whether the legislature possessed corporate 
capacity for the purposes of the trust, and this was wholly evaded. Since the 
island possessed a Chancellor, and since only two years earlier Lord Hardwicke 
in Attorney General v. Middleton 93 had held that the Chancery had 
possessed original jurisdiction over charities at large independent of the statute, 
it is difficult to see just what a refusal to extend the statute accomplished 
for the future handling of similar matters. Possibly Willes was influenced in 
his thinking by the recent act 9 George 11, c. 36, which restrained devises of 
realty for charitable purposes. This act applied to England only, but was essentially 
a revival of mortmain law insofar as devises of realty were concerned. 
The refusal to extend 43 Elizabeth, c. 4, to Antigua in effect accomplished the 
same end as to the island. 94 
A few years later there came before the Council a much more difficult 
90 Case of Respondent {Add. MS, 36,217/38- 
43). Some question was raised as to whether 
the Statute of Frauds and 9 Geo. 11, c. 36, extended 
to the colony, but the contention of extension 
was not seriously pressed. 
91 Endorsed on the Case of Respondent 
(Add. MS, 36,217/43). 
92 PC 2/103/330, 344. This is presumably the 
"Nevis" case mentioned by Lord Mansfield 
during the argument in Campbell v. Hall, 20 
Howell, State Trials, 289. 
93 2 Vesey Sen. 327. 
94 Cf. Finlason, History and Effects of Laws 
of Mortmain (1853), 44.