one of the most considerable Points of our Rights, and the Case being so doubtful, 
we are too often obliged to depend upon the Crooked Cord of a Judge's Discretion 
in matters of the greatest moment and value. 
The writer goes on to propose as a remedy for the dilemma which he describes 
both as an "inconvenience" and a "grievance," that "some Rule be established 
to know what laws the Plantations are to be subject to, and particularly how 
far the late Acts of Parliament do affect them where they are not expressly 
mentioned." 22 
The manner of referring to judicial discretion indicates the writer knew 
Coke's Institutes, , 23 but it is unlikely that he was familiar with Calvin's Case 
from which such a rule as he desired could be constructed. The "inconveniences" 
he describes arose partly from ignorance or unwillingness to pursue the 
policy laid out in that case. But they also came partly from the necessities 
created by inadequate sources of reference. A colonial lawyer in pursuit of a 
known rule of law perforce turned to what was available to him. The quest 
for certainty was more compelling than any distinctions as to provenance, and 
consequently in many provincial jurisdictions statutes possessed a validity as 
precedents almost on a par with judicial decisions. 
There is evidence of uncertainty in other colonies. Thus, in 1701 it was reported 
of Massachusetts that acts of Parliament were regarded as obligatory 
only when the province was particularly named therein. But any acts might 
be utilized to serve friendly interests, so that predictability was lacking. 24 
From the Leeward Islands, Governor Codrington wrote in the same year of 
the necessity of resolving the uncertainty concerning the force of acts of Parliament 
in those islands, remarking that one chancery cause had continued fifteen 
years because of this uncertainty. 25 No evidence appears of knowledge of 
the English precedents; instead Codrington mentioned commonly held opinions 
that only acts relating to "commutative," as opposed to "distributive," 
justice or only acts declaratory of the common law were in force. 26 In 1705 it 
was charged that Rhode Island and Connecticut allowed to be pleaded in their 
courts only such laws of England as served their purposes. 27 As to the Carolinas, 
it was asserted in 1709 to be a general rule of law that no acts of Parlia- 
22 Similar views are expressed in Hartwell, 
Blair, and Chilton, The Present State of Virginia, 
and the College (1727) (ed. by H. D. 
Farish, 1940), 40. Cf. the 1701 opinion of 
George Larkin (CSP, Col., 1701, #1103). For 
a 1681 opinion of Attorney General Jones on 
the extension of the Statute of Frauds to Virginia 
see 2 Va. Col. Dec, Barradall's Rep. 
(1909), 81-82. But in 1724 we find it stated 
that "all the laws and statutes of England before 
Queen Elizabeth are there in force, but 
none made since; except those that mention 
the plantations" (H. Jones, Present State of Virginia 
[1724], 63). 
23 Coke, First Institute [On Littleton), 227b. 
24 CSP, Col, 1701, #945. 
25 Ibid., #997. 
26 Ibid., #997 ii. 
27 Ibid., 17045, #975-76.