the conquest was from infidels, their laws were abrogated, and until certain 
laws were introduced they were to be governed by the crown according to 
natural equity. It was next pointed out that once the laws of England were 
introduced, as in conquered Ireland, these could not be altered without Parliament, 
and furthermore that in the case of a distinct dominion, by express 
reference acts of Parliament might bind. 
English law has always made its new quilts from old rags, and Calvin's 
Case was no exception to this rule. In spite of an occasional bit from the Holy 
Writ, the civil law, and even natural law, the "opinion" was mainly wrought 
from medieval materials. Ancient doctrine was given new vigor from the circumstances 
of its fresh assessment and summation and because it was thus projected 
into the constitutional law of the era of colonization. The King's possessions 
are discussed in terms of English property law, itself the product of 
feudalism, a fact which explains the archaic doctrine of the judges that what 
does not come by descent is by conquest. The acceptance of this postulate of 
necessity required an admission of the extensive prerogative of the crown with 
respect to dominions so acquired. Of no less significance for the future is the 
consistent recognition of the fact that dominions not parcel of the realm may 
be ordered by distinct laws. Although ordinary remedial writs do not run in 
such places, a "mandatory" royal writ may, and redress is to be according to 
the law of the dominion. Similarly, in the case of the Channel Islands a royal 
commission runs, but again judgment must be by local law. 7 
The bearing of all this upon plantation problems is implicit in the remarks 
upon the extent of royal prerogative —a contemporary judicial carte blanche 
respecting the law and government of the new lands with the caveat that the 
power of alteration passes to Parliament once the law of England is introduced. 
What the crown had thus far done with respect to the Virginia enterprise 
to all appearances might have been contrived with Coke's report of 
Calvin's Case at the royal elbow. The charter of 1606 refers to Virginia as 
territory "appertaining to us" B—an8 —an obvious assertion of the dominion of the 
crown principle. The royal instructions 9 issued in the same year make certain 
specifications respecting landholding, inheritance, crimes, and trial, none of 
which would be necessary if it had been assumed that the colonists carried 
their law with them or if English law had applied ipso vigore. An ordinance 
power is given with the proviso that the King or the Council of Virginia may 
alter or make void any ordinance, "soe always as the same alterations may 
stand with, and be in substance consonant unto the lawes of England or the 
7 This is explicitly restated in Coke, Fourth 
Institute, 286. 
9 1 Brown, Genesis of the United States, 65 et 
seq. 
8 7 Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, 
3783.