cil were not authorized by the royal instructions to take cognizance of cases 
in error were presented on March 27, 1765. 248 Needless to say, no action was 
taken upon this proposal. 
Popular clamor was aroused by representation of judges and counsel that 
the instruction in question was designed to alter the constitution and to abrogate 
trial by jury. 249 Colden, however, allayed Whitehall fears by representing 
that no case could be shown where jury trial would be prevented by the instruction, 
nor was it probable that there would be many appeals from Supreme 
Court causes. 250 Colden thought that the people would discover after the 
initial excitement that no other security of their property against powerful 
factions existed. A recommended palliative was the removal from office of 
Chief Justice Horsmanden, Justice Livingston, and Attorney General Kempe, 
and the appointment of "fit persons," free from provincial attachments and 
provided with salaries sufficient to insure freedom from assembly influence. 251 
Following the publication of the proceedings in the cause in newspaper and 
pamphlet form, the agitation was kept alive by the writings of "The Sentinel" 
in the New-Yor\ Gazette; or, The Weekly Post-Boy. 262 This commentator, 
identified in some quarters as William Livingston, elaborated the disadvantages 
inherent in the interpretation contended for by Colden, refuted Colden's 
arguments, and heaped ridicule upon their proponent. 253 
248 29 MS Mins. N.Y. Council, 70-72. Colden 
reasoned as follows: (a) By the law of errors 
in England the subject had the right to a 
writ of error in criminal causes, as well as 
in civil; but by instruction the Governor and 
Council could judge only in civil cases, (b) 
By instruction the Governor and Council had 
no authority in cases under X3OO sterling, but 
in England the subject had the right to a 
writ of error in all cases above 40s. (c) If the 
instruction referred to writs of error, it would 
be superfluous to provide that security be 
given or that execution be suspended, (d) 
The word "condemnation" would be absurd 
in error proceedings, for no new judgment 
was given in error; the judgment below was 
either affirmed or reversed, (e) In all cases 
of error removal from inferior to superior 
court was by writ, but no writ could issue in 
the province to remove a cause before the 
King in Council. (/) In error, causes went 
before more learned judges; here the council 
were not more learned, but were more qualified 
to judge on the merits than regular juries. 
(g) In the only case removed before the King 
and Council a new judgment on die merits 
was given as in cases of appeal. 
249 7 Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., 699. But 
Colden wrote that the objection to appeals was 
largely confined to New York City, where 
landed and legal interests were strong; it was 
otherwise in the country, where the farmers 
had suffered from the domination of the great 
proprietors and the lawyers (ibid., 707). 
250 Ibid., 707. The lieutenant-governor wrote 
that so far as he remembered there had not 
been six causes brought before the council 
either on appeal or in error in forty years. 
These figures are incorrect. He also asserted 
that in that time only one cause was carried 
by appeal to the King in Council, in which 
case the judgment of the Supreme Court was 
neither reversed nor affirmed as in error, but 
a new judgment on the merits of the cause 
given different from that of the Supreme 
Court. This statement is also incorrect. 
251 Ibid., 699—700, 703. 
252 Horsmanden, C. J., to Governor Monckton, 
May 4, 1765, in Chalmers MSS, 4 New York,, 
27; 2 Colden Letter Books, 2, 4—5; 7 Doc. 
Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., 709-10, 760-61, 768-69. 
The cause also enjoyed some notoriety in England; 
see Letters of Dennys De Berdt, 1757-70, 
13 Pub. Col. Soc. Mass., 314-15. 
253 The Sentinel, No. 1, was largely devoted 
to a savage criticism of the inhibitory writ 
sealed by Colden on Oct. 30 (cj. supra, p. 392). 
It also declared that there was no room for