arguments drawn from use of the words "appellant," "appellee," and "condemnation" 
in the instruction were easily disposed of. 238 
As to the arguments of convenience, the cheapness of litigation in colonies 
where the "pretorian method" was employed was a great encouragement to 
a litigious spirit. Yet at the same time, while inexpensive litigation was a great 
disadvantage to any country, pretorian appeals would constitute an expense 
too excessive for the subject. Again reiterated was the necessity for the Governor 
and Council and also the Privy Council to sit continuously to determine 
all appeals on matters of fact. 239 Such appeals would render the expense of 
jury trials useless, encourage perjury on appeal, foster litigiousness, and be 
attended with great danger in transmission of evidence such as deeds on appeal. 
Also, the benefit of a view in real property trials would be lost. As to the 
abrogation of trial by juries, it was maintained that such trial was the birthright 
of every subject and was fixed by the established laws of the land; it 
could not be altered by anything short of the legislative authority. Although 
the King had seen fit to grant appeals in cases of fines, perhaps in the sense 
contended for by Colden, yet this was not in derogation of the rights of the 
subject, but a manifestation of the royal clemency. By law, fines belonged to 
the crown, so the King might without incurring complaint direct such a 
method of inquiry into the merits as he thought proper, to enable him to 
judge on the quantum of the fine imposed. 240 As relief against iniquitous 
verdicts, motion for a new trial, attaint, error quod coram vobis residet, and 
audita querela were represented as proper methods of relief; in each case the 
jury remained the final factual arbiter. The King could not reasonably have 
intended to afford a method of relief different from these, unknown to the 
common law, and never granted to the subjects of England. An anti-Colden 
interpretation of the -p.& instruction would still leave the Supreme Court subject 
to control by writ of error. 241 
In summation the anti-Colden manifesto asserted that an appeal from the 
verdict of a jury was unknown to the laws of England, the jury having the 
final determination of all factual matters; that the statute of 7 and 8 William 
111, c. 22, had erected the laws of England in force at the time of the settlement 
of the colony as the standard of law in the colony; that the gubernatorial 
instruction prohibiting deprivation of life, limb, or property otherwise than 
by established and known laws not repugnant to the laws of England was 
supported by and calculated to enforce obedience to that statute; that in ac- 
238 Ibid., 46-49. If the carrying up a cause 
by writ of error was an appeal, the party 
plaintiff must be an "appellant" and the party 
defendant "appellee." The word "condemnation" 
had reference to the judgment in the 
court below. For Jones v. Fullerton, see supra, 
n. 66. 
2 ™lbii., 50-51. 
2io lbid., 51-53. 
241 Ibid., 53-56.