lands was in question or the prerogative or rights of the crown affected. It was cautioned that a delay in determining the matter would be construed as a tacit withdrawal of the instruction. 224 On January 2, 1765, Colden rendered to his council an exhaustive opinion on the controverted matter of appeals, 223 a mighty bit of fireside jurisprudence. The lieutenant-governor alleged that the opposition arguments failed to distinguish between laws and the execution thereof; the King could establish diverse methods of judicial procedure suited to individual colonies, although such variously constituted courts all administered the common law. Secondly, it was essential to the royal prerogative that "appeals" lie to the King, otherwise the dependence of the colonies could not be preserved. Then, launching into a pseudo-historical argument, Colden alleged that appeals to the King in person existed by the early common law and were confirmed by Magna Carta. At that time no distinction between appeals and writs of error existed, since there was then no distinction between judges and juries. Writs of error were a later introduction in the courts of Westminster, and were not part of the common law. Their use was confined to courts where assumed powers were confirmed by usage, unless extended by act of Parliament. This was made more evident by the case of the Channel Islands where judicial trials were by jury and the remedy was by appeal to the King in Council, not by writ of error. The reason for this distinction was that the islands were not part of the realm of England; the case of the Isle of Man was similar. 220 It was evident, said Colden, that by the common law no writ of error could lie in the colonies, because they were no part of the realm of England, and no act of Parliament had extended writs of error thereto. The King had not given the Governor and Council power to determine on writ of error, but only on appeals, by which the whole cause was brought up for transmission, if necessary, upon further appeal to the King in Council. From the other colonies Colden referred to the appeal reservation clauses in the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts charters and to the fact that in Connecticut appeals were obtained by petition for royal mandatory writs. Appeals were allowed in several other colonies, and he had no knowledge of any instance of an appeal refusal 227 The earlier arguments as to the construction of the instructional language and as to convenience were repeated. 22S To the principal objection that "appeals" deprived the subject of the privilege of trial by jury, it was 234 7 Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., 683-85. 225 For an account o£ this rendition, see Letter Boo\ of John Watts, 321-22; 2 Aspinwall Papers, 549-50. 226 7 Colden Papers, NYHS Coll., Pub. Fund. Ser. (1923), 1-3. But Colden was in manifest error in his assertion that jury usage prevailed in the Channel Islands. Presumably he regarded the twelve jurats as jurors. 227 Ibid., 3-4. 228 Ibid., 4-6. It was also stated that the words "appellant" and "appellee" in the instruction