ing. The first rule that seems necessary to prevent unreasonable delay should be that the plaintiff in error assign error within a limited time after the writ is returned. If he does not or the matter assigned for errors should prima facie appear to the court not to be such or the sum or value appealed for should not exceed sterling, the Governor and Council should quash the writ whereby the defendant in error will be entitled to take out execution at law and may also have his remedy upon the recognizance taken below on allowing the writ, but if errors which seem sufficient to require examination are assigned by the plaintiff notice thereof be served on the defendant together with a rule to plead to them by a certain day. When he has done so an order may be had for setting down the cause for hearing and upon argument of the errors, the Governor and Council will either reverse, reform or affirm the judgment complained of as they think right and award costs in their discretion upon affirmance. Rutledge further observed that when judgment below was affirmed or reversed, "the superior court should also give such judgment as the inferior ought to have done." When an appeal to the King in Council was desired, the instruction clearly pointed out the terms on which it was granted. 174 On April 29 the South Carolina council, after considering the instruction and the Attorney General's report, were of the opinion that the intent of the instruction would be answered by pursuing the method pointed out by the Attorney General. Thereupon the clerk was directed to give notice that the board would hear and determine causes brought in that manner before it. 175 After all this fuss and flourish, the instant appeal never came on for hearing.l 76 On December 12, 1767, the governor informed his council that a day had been appointed for hearing Gaulphin v. Lubley as a Court of Error in pursuance of the royal instructions; that it being the first instance of its kind, it would be necessary to settle some rules for future observance. The council advised the governor to appoint a register and crier and that it would be proper to take the state oaths and an oath of office before sitting in judgment. But the council were of the opinion that the proceedings had in the pending cause would better enable them to settle any general rules for future observance. 177 Although the oaths were accordingly taken on December 15, 178 there is no evidence that the appeal was ever heard. From Rutledge's opinion it is evi- 174 32 ibid., 507-12. 175 32 ibid., 517-19. 176 In a Nov. 30, 1770, report to the Board of Trade it was stated that, "application was made,- six or seven years ago, to this jurisdiction [Governor and Council], but as it had never been exercised here, the Governor and Council were desirous to establish their first proceedings with circumspection, and sent to the Northern provinces for information but received nothing satisfactory; the appellants dropped their suit, and the jurisdiction remains unexperienced" {CO 5/394/ D 2). 177 33 MS So. Car. Council Journal, 306-7. 178 33 ibid., 312. Cf. MS Journal So. Car. Ct. Common Pleas, 1J63-6J, 292, where the action was designated as Lessee of Tubly v. Galphin.