Upon hearing, the judgment in error below was reversed and the judgment of the Supreme Court was affirmed. 148 The Committee did not confine itself to merely waiving procedural errors in the courts below, but might on occasion extend its review beyond the confines of orthodox review procedures. The first case found where such action was suggested on the part of a litigant was the Barbados appeal of Clarke and Gosling v. Smith. Appellants, in their brief, alleged that "the judicatures in our plantations neither do nor can proceed in that order and exactness that are observed in England and for this reason the Council Board go frequently farther to rectify mistakes than the Courts of Justice here can do upon writs of error." 149 This argument was obviously not seriously regarded, for judgment below was affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed. 150 However, in some cases the Committee went so far as to advise setting aside judgments and decrees where admittedly no error was found in the proceedings below. Such procedure is seen in Rogers v. Spalding, an appeal from a 1739 General Court of Virginia judgment, on the ground of erroneous refusal to admit in evidence some affidavits "sworn and transmitted under the seal of the City of London" according to 5 George 11, c. 7. In this case appellant was suing in case for ,£524 appropriated by respondent from the estate willed appellant by his brother lately deceased in Africa. Respondent defended that the property was taken in his capacity of Royal African Company agent according to the company rules governing estates of employees. Further, it was contended that 5 George 11, c. 7, should be strictly confined so as not to admit evidence otherwise inadmissible, that the proper oath had not been taken, that the instant case was not within the purview of the act (since it did not relate to trade or the plantations), and that no adversarial notice had been given of the taking of the evidence offered. 151 The Committee reported that the affidavits were not strictly regular, but as the merits of the cause had not been laid be- IiS PC 2/115/349. 364. 149 Case of Respondent (L.C., Law Div.). 150 PC 2/103/355, 4°B. Later, in 1780, prevalence of this view of the conciliar appellate scope is also found in Jamaica. In the examination of John Baker concerning the governor's removal of some judges from the Supreme Court for granting a mandamus in Rex v. Brownrigg, the following question was asked: "If the judges or jury did wrong was not a writ of error a more constitutional and a more legal remedy than removing the judges?" Baker replied that he thought it was, "wishing it to be understood that by a writ of error, he means not only what is usually understood by error, but to include that ap- peal which is open to the subject from all the colonies to the King in Council, and which he thinks is competent in cases where there is no doubt that a writ of error does not lye, but he thinks in case of mandamus generally error does lye" (CO 137/38/132). 151 PC 2/95/546; Cases of Appellant and Respondent (Harvard Univ. Law Lib.). In the court below, the bench accepted the argument of defendant's counsel that the affidavits were taken when no suit was pending, that the act only extended to cases where suits were actually depending, and that defendant ought to have notice (Jefferson, Rep's Cases General Ct. Va. [1829], 58-59).