however much the provincial men of God might seek to bemuddle things by 
pretending their appeal was a writ of error or by deliberately fabricating an 
attenuated record, the conditions which they themselves had laid down were 
to be fulfilled. This is apparent from the judgment in Wharton v. Northrup 
and from Vassail v. Fletcher. 
THE CHANCERY APPEAL 
Up to this point we have had under consideration largely the attempted expansion 
by the Council of the common law error jurisdiction, but it is essential 
likewise to observe how the role of a court of appeal in chancery causes was 
played and what this may have contributed to the attempted definition of 
the appellate function in general. At the outset it should be noticed that the 
very term for review by the Privy Council was derived from ecclesiastical and 
chancery jurisprudence and that notwithstanding the directional force of 
Channel Islands precedents, the use of the word "appeal" was likely to promote 
resort to methods of equity. Some of the evidence just discussed with respect 
to certification of facts is itself proof that this took place. 
The appeal in chancery causes furnished an opportunity par excellence for 
the broadest exercise of review powers and the development of policy respecting 
judgment on the merits. One of the most interesting of these cases, for it 
serves to illustrate how the chancery procedure was extended to embrace interstitial 
common law practice, is Mendez v. Battyn, a 1722 appeal from a 
Barbados chancery decree. Here an issue of fact had been ordered tried below 
at common law by a jury. A special verdict was then found and returned 
to the Chancery Court. 120 It was alleged by appellants that several facts had 
been found contrary to the evidence in this special verdict. This difficulty was 
circumvented by annexing to the verdict the evidence presented to the jury, 
and in this way the Committee had the whole matter before it to judge 
thereof. 127 Related to this case is the ground for reversal urged on appeal in 
1764 from some Jamaica chancery proceedings in McKenzie v. Woodhouse 
128 namely, that the Master in Chancery had heard witnesses viva voce 
126 Case of Appellant (Add. MS, 36,216/8). 
See also 2 APC, Col., #1203. 
127 Appellant set forth in his conciliar "case" 
that the special verdict was found and returned 
to Chancery, "but in a most irregular manner 
and several facts found directly contrary to 
the evidence, and without a tittle of evidence 
to support them. However, the jurors take 
notice in their verdict, 'That they have annexed 
thereto certain papers containing the 
evidence given them by ten persons therein 
named; who they say were all the living 
persons produced to them.' And they have 
also annexed all the papers and writings given 
in evidence to them; so that the whole evidence 
being all returned under seal annexed 
to the verdict the Lords of the Committee 
have the whole matter before them to judge." 
At the hearing before the Privy Council the 
decree of September 2, 1719, was reversed 
"on the point of want of equity" and the bill 
ordered dismissed {Add. MS, 36,216/8). 
128 For the course of the appeal see 4 APC, 
Col, #408.