In those continental colonies in which the common law record was de rigueur the opinion seems to have persisted that special verdicts were desirable for appeal purposes, if not utterly necessary, but we have not seen any evidence that measures were taken as drastic as those in the West Indies. Most of the comment is professional. Thus, in a 1760 Maryland cause involving enforcement of proprietary rights a general verdict following a loose direction to bring in a special verdict was characterized as having "darkened the proper lights for an appeal." 58 Again, in 1763 Thomas Penn was advised in regard to a pending Pennsylvania suit of the necessity of a special verdict to obtain a conciliar judgment upon the merits. But his adviser, Henry Wilmot, declared that election to direct such verdict resided with the court, not with the parties, but that it would be "monstrous" in a jury to refuse to find specially upon such direction. 5T Counsel Benjamin Chew, better acquainted with Pennsylvania by the King in Council. See Mackaskell v. Robinson {PC 2/82/276, 287); Jones v. Tolleson (PC 2/86/381); Huggins v. Warren (PC 2/93/93); Mills v. Ottley (PC 2/102/87; PC 2/103/244, 262); Keeling v. Niles (PC 2/121/403, 556). Cf. Bayer v. Warner (PC 2/95/506). Similarly, in the case of an agreed statement of facts in lieu of a special verdict, see Burgess v. Hack (PC 2/94/293; Add. MS, 36,216/105). Also a partial court might accept a special verdict which found only the evidence of one party to the cause. In Elliot v. Perne from Antigua a special verdict had been asked for by counsel, and the Court of Common Pleas had seemed to grant it, "but when the verdict was ready to be produced, was brought in and it appearing not to be a speciall verdict drawn upp in forme, whereby the whole fact according to the evidence given might appear; the said Mr. Pember and this deponent made several objections against the verdict, as that they found but one part of the fact arising only from the defendant's evidence, and take no notice of the plaintiff's evidence which was directly contrary to that of the defendant's, notwithstanding which and some hours argument, that the verdict might be drawne upp in forme by the counsell on both sides and a case made of it, the court overruled it and positively refused we should have any other verdict than what appears" (PC 1/47; see also 6 APC, Col., #190). The appeal was dismissed as not regularly brought by way of appeal from the Governor and Council according to the rules of appealing (PC 2/82/312, 317). Or the court might show partiality in the acceptance of evidence to ground the special verdict (2 Correspondence of Governor Horatio Sharps, 9 Md. Archives, 382-83). 66 Ibid., 383. For further discussion o£ this case, Wright's Lessee v. Jones, see Md. H.R. Portfolio 4, #53 (d); Stephen Bordley to Governor Sharpe, July 4, 1760. For threats of removal from office because of irregular judicial behavior in this case, see ibid., #53 (e) (f). For the ability to secure a new trial upon a general verdict found contrary to judicial direction in Maryland, see Edmund Jennings to Lord Baltimore, May 27, 1743 (1 Gilmor MSS, Md. Hist. Soc). 57 The suit was with the "Jersey Society" in regard to Callowhill Manor, and Wilmot was consulted as to a method for making the defendants consent to a special verdict. Wilmot wrote: "The necessity of a special verdict is evident, for if there be a general verdict no appeal can assist you for the evidence is not transmitted. So that though the verdict were ever so contrary to evidence, such evidence not appearing here, you could have no redress, and no evidence appearing to the contrary, the verdict must be presumed to be right. But if the whole facts as they appeared at the tryal be found specially, and the whole submitted by the jury in point of law to the court, then whichever way the court in Philadelphia determines, the other party (if he thinks he is injured) may appeal, and the whole merits (which must be transmitted upon the face of the record) will be determined here on the appeal, but there is no way to compel the defendants to consent to a special verdict. Nor can I conceive the necessity of the consent of the defendants to a special verdict. The