to direct a special verdict when desired was so absurd that the act was not 
proper to be passed into law. 50 However, there is no evidence that the act was 
disallowed. 51 
In 1724 Governor Hart of the Leeward Islands, commenting upon an act 
from St. Christopher containing a clause "that jurors shall be obliged (if the 
Council on both sides consent) to find a special verdict under pain of fine 
and imprisonment," confessed that this clause seemed extraordinary and was 
not a power practiced in Westminster Hall. 52 But he conceived that the legislative 
bodies 
were moved to find out this extraordinary remedy from the very great obstinacy 
they had observed frequently in jurors here, who contrary to the judge's directions, 
and even request, would often find an issue generally, although it rested on one 
or more intricate points of law, which the jury could not be presumed to understand, 
nor were obliged to judge of, that by such general verdict the party grieved 
is barred of having his right determined by them whose province it is, or of appealing 
upon the merits of his cause, to His Sacred Majesty in Council, which is the 
most certain resource the subject has of justice. 53 
We do not know how the acts in question came to be passed, since they run 
counter to the usual colonial feeling respecting the curtailment of jury prerogative, 
and it has not been possible to examine the remnant records in these 
islands to ascertain whether or not there was an increase in special verdicts. 
In Jamaica, however, we have found the situation was dealt with in an extremely 
shrewd manner, by the use of a procedural device which made it 
unnecessary to resort to clumsy and possibly unpalatable legislation. This development 
appears on its face to have been adopted to avoid jury recalcitrance 
upon directions to find specially. At the close of the evidence one or both parties 
moved for directed verdicts, and upon refusal exceptions were taken thereto. 
The party against whom judgment went then presented for sealing a bill of 
exceptions in which all the evidence of both parties was set forth. 54 Since all 
the evidence was in writing, the conciliar conditions precedent for judgment 
on the merits were satisfied and jury obstinance was avoided. 55 
50 CSP, Col, 1720-21, #114. 
51 This act has been mentioned previously in 
connection with the controversy between 
William Gordon and Governor Lowther, 
supra, pp. 229-30. 
52 CSP, Col., 1724-25, #253. The exact 
wording of the statute was "that special verdicts 
shall be found by the jurors, where the 
council on both sides shall agree, and desire 
to have the facts found specially, upon pain of 
fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the 
court" {Acts of Assembly St. Christopher, 
17U-35 [i 739]. 90). 
53 CSP, Col., 1724-2;, #253 
54 Crymble v. Doe ex dem. Crymble (2 MS 
Jamaica Court of Errors Proceedings, 90); 
Barclay v. Morley {ibid., 112); Doe ex dem. 
Sharpe v. Witter {ibid., 123). 
55 Certain other procedural advantages are inherent 
in this use of a general verdict with a 
bill of exceptions. Special verdicts might be 
imperfect or uncertain and thus be set aside