determination on the merits was frustrated by such refusal, although it is probably too much to expect the yokelry of New Hampshire to have been aware of this. It is more probable that juries in the plantations had a natural and often well-grounded distrust of leaving to the magistrates any part of their own function. In other words, it was less anxiety respecting possible appeals than it was uneasiness over abridgment of jury prerogative that made the general verdict desirable. This attitude is most marked in cases of crown suits, where the men of the vicinage were extremely distrustful of the device which left to the judges the final word on questions such as intrusions, naval supplies, and the like, which affected the native conceptions of property. In 1709 Governor Handasyd of Jamaica complained to the Board of Trade that in a crown prosecution for some ambergris cast up on shore he had ordered the Attorney General to demand a special verdict, but that this demand had been positively refused and the jury found generally against the Queen. 44 The Board of Trade submitted the matter to Attorney General Montague, 45 who replied that it lay within the power of the jury to decide whether they would give a general or a special verdict. Therefore, the most that crown counsel could do was to desire the jury not to take upon themselves the determination of matters which in point of law were disputable, but to find the facts specially and submit the points of law to the judgment of the court. Montague continued that such refractory conduct was often seen in the courts of England; crown counsel were forced to submit thereto, unless they could hope to get a more favorable jury returned, in which case they moved for a new trial. Since matters in the Jamaica courts usually went against the crown when there was any doubt, Montague questioned whether granting a new trial would be of any avail; and as it would probably only entail greater expenses for the Queen, no further action in the matter was counseled. 46 This right to a new trial was strongly asserted a few years later in Reginay. Bewdley.* 7 In 1710 Lieutenant-Governor Usher of New Hampshire adverted to the necessity for special verdicts in suits for preservation of the woods reserved for crown usage. Usher somewhat unintelligibly suggested legislation compelling direction of special verdicts, but recognized the alternative of transmission of all the evidence in writing. 48 44 The governor was of the opinion that this was contrary to the laws of England (CSP, Col, 1708-9, #573). 45 Ibid., #845. i6 lbid., #868. On the right of a jury to return a general verdict see Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 Yale L.J., 575, 579-81. 47 1 Peere Williams, 207, 212. The Lord Chief Justice of England delivered it as the opinion of all the judges of England, except one, "that when the defendant's counsel pray a special verdict, and the court direct the jury to find one, if the jury will take upon them to go contrary to that direction, and find matter of law, it is sufficient ground for a new trial." Cf. Musgrave v. Nevinson (2 Ld. Raymond, 1358). 48 CSP, Col, 1710-11, #510.