selectivity of conciliar jurisdiction? The answer may reside in the realm of 
semantics. Statements that appeals would not lie on general verdicts may have 
had reference to "appeals on the merits." Or the conflicting conciliar views 
may be explained by the fluctuating personnel of the Committee. What is 
certain is that the Committee favored proceedings below which gave greatest 
scope to its review power, although it seems to have lacked the iron to carry 
through its own suggestions that colonial judges in the strict common law 
jurisdictions could be obliged to certify a statement of evidence. During the 
period under consideration the Committee never got beyond the equivocal 
position of merely directing special verdicts at the new trial 40 or instructing 
that evidence be taken down in writing for transmission to England. 41 
COLONIAL OPINION ON THE FORM OF VERDICT 
It is obvious from the evidence discussed that the proposition that "the home 
government refused to permit the use of general verdicts" 42 is incorrect as 
respects the policy of the Privy Council. At the same time, it is equally obvious 
that in various colonies the conviction prevailed for some time that appeals 
in cases in which a general verdict had been rendered were not likely to be 
entertained or at least were foredoomed. It is extremely difficult to determine 
how well informed the bars of the several colonies were respecting the periodic 
changes in Privy Council opinion and how far particular decisions were regarded 
as reliable bases for prediction as to future action. In many of the 
provinces the lawyers were both able and astute, and they could hardly have 
been unaware of the ad hoc nature of every decision. The colonial attitude is 
extremely important, since the character of proceedings below was in all events 
largely determinative of the course of affairs at Whitehall. In this relation the 
popular attitude was no less significant than the notions of the bar, since it 
flared up either in the form of jury recalcitrance or in legislative activity. For 
these reasons it is desirable to examine the manifestations of colonial opinion. 
We have already noticed the refusal of New Hampshire juries to bring in 
special verdicts in the Allen suits. 43 Since evidence was customarily incorporated 
in the record in that colony, it is difficult to perceive wherein conciliar 
40 In the case In re America it was ordered 
that if a suit were necessary for restitution of 
the res, all evidence should be found specially 
that the fact might fully appear on appeal 
(PC 2/80/397-400). In Broome v. Eyles, respondent 
was given leave to bring ejectment; 
if either party desired a special verdict at such 
trial, it was to be granted (PC 2/97/26, 115). 
In McCarty v. McCarty respondent was to be 
at liberty to proceed to a new trial upon the 
former issue within a year after notice of reversal; 
upon such new trial the jury was to 
find a special verdict, and a March 29, 1724, 
will verbatim, and all material facts necessary 
to bring the matter in question fully before 
the court (PC 2/103/360, 408). 
41 Jones v. Toleson (PC 2/86/220, 381). 
42 See Washburne, Imperial Control of Administration 
of Justice, 74. 
43 See supra, p. 155.