upon such declination the Board might offer administrative advice influencing 
judicial decision. 454 Furthermore, the administrative scope of the Board at 
times infringed upon the realm of the judicial. 455 In the earlier period of the 
Board's operation the practice existed of referring conciliar petitions for leave 
to appeal to it for consideration and report. 450 There was no warrant for such 
practice in the Board's commission, but presumably conciliar reference could 
supplement the commission terms. 457 It was stated by Attorney General 
Northey in 1717 that the reference of such petitions to the Board of Trade was 
improper. For, he averred, "petitions for appeal from decrees given, in the 
plantations, have been always referred to a committee of the council for hearing 
the causes of the plantations, and on their report, that it is proper to allow 
the appeal prayed for, his Majesty in Council has usually allowed the same, 
and not in any other manner." 458 But the Committee might still seek the 
Board of Trade's advice as to admission of an appeal. 469 
Although the Board of Trade was functionally insignificant in individual 
appeals, it played a considerable role in the general administration of imperial 
justice, appellate and original. In the first years of the eighteenth century the 
imperial authorities sought to strengthen control over colonial courts by demanding 
information concerning their proceedings. Thus, in July, 1700, the 
Council ordered that directions be sent by the Board of Trade to the various 
governors to transmit an account in the most particular manner of the method 
of proceedings in their several courts, upon trial of all types of causes, for better 
information in the determination of conciliar appeals. 480 Later, in April, 1703, 
circular letters went forth from the Board of Trade to most of the colonies requiring 
transmission of accounts of all causes dispatched and pending and in 
1754-58, 85). Upon the complaint of unreasonable 
delays in a suit in the Nova Scotia 
courts, the Board "did not think it proper or 
consistent with the rules of their proceedings 
to take cognizance of a matter of property, 
now in suit before the proper courts in the 
colony" (ibid., 1759-63, 353). In 1764 one 
Isaac Levi was informed that his petition in re 
Georgia included "questions of private property, 
which could only be adjudged in the 
first instance by the proper courts in the 
colony, from which an appeal would lye to 
his Majesty in Council" (ibid., 1764-67, 94). 
In 1769 Newfoundland memorialists were informed 
that their memorials related to questions 
of private right and property, not determinable 
by the Board and that application 
should have been made to the Privy 
Council (ibid., 1768-75, 70). 
454 CSP, Col, 1724-25, #814. 
455 The 1699 hearing of a complaint of John 
Lucas against Governor Codrington of the 
Leeward Islands resulted in remission of a 
£100 fine (CSP, Col., 1699, #25, 113, 154, 
2 33> 335> 344> 4°5)- As we shall see, confusion 
existed in many colonies as to the extension 
of acts of Parliament thereto. Resolution of 
this confusion was a judicial matter in individual 
appeals, yet in one instance the 
Board directed against allowing the Statute 
of Limitations to be pleaded in Nevis (ibid., 
1696-97, #735, 803, 1405). 
456 But complaints of denials of leave to appeal 
could not be made directly to the Board 
of Trade (CSP, Col, 1701, #885). 
457 See supra, pp. 134-35. 
458 2 Chalmers, Opinions, 177. 
459 g ee p r ; ce v . Warren (PC 2/100/526, 539). 
460 CSP, Col, j 700, #651. For the colonies 
to which the order was sent see ibid., #679.