At the hearing before the Committee the appellant urged that, if it had appeared 
at the former hearing that the money in question had been paid respondent 
(it was paid into court), restitution would have been specifically ordered; 
that at any rate restitution was inherent in the reversing Order in Council. In 
effect, the Chancellor was complaining of the September 24, 1759, chancery 
order granting the appeal and was drawing into question the propriety of the 
ultimate decision. 445 In answer, the respondent contended that the supposed 
leave to appeal was fictitious; that the appeal was actually denied; that if the 
appeal was granted, it was a nullity, as being directly contrary to the royal 
instructions; that the time limited therein for taking appeals could be enlarged 
only by application to the King in Council. He asserted also that the Chancellor 
had refused restitution as the whole proceeding was secret and surreptitious 
448 To this contention of voidness, appellant in replication denied the 
doctrine and asserted the contrary as true. Otherwise the Committee would 
not have received and entertained the appeal, much less proceeded to hear and 
reverse. 447 The Committee thereupon reported that the governor had not 
heeded the April 12, 1762, Order in Council as he should have done by 
restoring appellant to all lost by the former decree; that the £gyy/-/g paid 
out of court to respondent should be restored to appellant with interest; and 
that the governor should do everything necessary to restore the money to appellant. 
This was accordingly ordered on July 26, 1765. 448 
This review of the cases in which opposition was exhibited to enforcement 
of Orders in Council should not obscure the regular enforcement in numerous 
other appeals. Furthermore, this recalcitrance should not be regarded solely 
as a politically significant colonial practice, for there are a proportionate number 
of Channel Islands causes in which disobedience by the respective Royal 
Courts necessitated further conciliar enforcing orders. 449 But some corrective 
445 Case of Appellant (Add. MS, 36,219/154). 
446 Case of Respondent (Add. MS, 36,219/ 
158). Cf. Lawrence v. Wilson and Taylor, 
where respondent also prayed dismissal on the 
ground that the appeal was granted five 
months after the decree appealed from; that 
consequently the governor had no power to 
grant such appeal under his instructions (Case 
of Respondent; L.C., Law Div.). 
447 Add. MS, 36,219/166. 
448 PC 2/111/272, 302. Cf. the June, 1755, 
disregard shown by the Jamaica Supreme Court 
toward an Order in Council on the imprisonment 
of Francis Delap (4 APC, Col., #252), 
on the ground that the order was not directed 
and did not extend to the Supreme Court (An 
Account of the Trial of Francis Delap, Esq.; 
Late Provost Marshal-General, upon an Information 
for a Misdemeanor [1755], 14-15). 
449 See Andros v. Priaulx (PC 2/79/154); le 
Sbirell v. Messervy et al. (PC 2/80/387, 412); 
Tapin v. Rex (PC 2/86/279, 288, 382, 397; 
PC 1/3 [15]); Corbet v. Dumaresq (PC 2/ 
85/461, 470; PC 2/86/4, 162, 169; PC 1/4 
[20]); de Carteret v. Dumaresq (PC 2/88/ 
571, 606, 614) where the Committee termed a 
refusal of the jurats to register an Order in 
Council as not only an unwarranted obstruction 
to justice, but also a contempt of the 
royal authority; Hamond v. Poingdestre (PC 
2/89/89, 95). In a 1773 letter Lieutenant- 
Governor Corbet related that refusal to register 
Orders in Council in appeals was frequently 
based upon the plea that the Order 
in Council did not direct the Royal Court 
to make such registration (Corbet to Lord 
Rochford, Aug. 20, 1773 [SP 47/7]). In The 
Tyranny of the Magistrates of Jersey (London,