ply with the Council's order where possible, the judges were bound by oath 
to maintain and support laws, usages, and practices in some measure differing 
from the Order in Council. 
We did not and cannot consider ourselves merely as executive officers, or as a 
sheriff commanded to execute a certain precept or execution; but, as judges, under 
a peculiar constitution, we were to look into said decrees and to make up judgments 
thereon. The making or giving judgment implies some consideration and therein 
we could not but consider that one part of the said decree was essentially contrary 
to the uninterrupted practice and usage of the courts here and throughout all New 
England, and also contrary to the statute laws of this colony, then and still in force. 
Affidavits were also offered to show that by Rhode Island practice no depreciation 
was allowed on interest payments where none was allowed on principal 
payments and that no interest was allowed after proof of tender before suit, 
although after the due date. 429 
After a Committee hearing of counsel on both sides, the Superior Court 
judges were peremptorily ordered in July, 1774, forthwith and without delay 
to comply with the April 14,1769, Order in Council. 430 In the following October 
the Freebodys petitioned the General Assembly for a direction to the Superior 
Court "to order the said decree to be carried litterally into execution 
according to its tenor, true intent and meaning." The Assembly accordingly 
resolved that the decree be laid before the court to be put into execution. 431 
Thereupon the Order in Council was presented at the Superior Court, and 
execution was prayed according to the Assembly act. After respondents were 
cited and heard, the court ordered redemption of the premises on payment of 
,£28,179 °ld tenor bills emitted before 1748, plus _£ 2,722/16/6% lawful money 
with interest until payment. 432 Thus ends the saga of Freebody v. Brenton. 
Such intractability was not endemic to New England courts. In the case 
In re America from the Leeward Islands, complaint was made of refusal to 
comply with a December, 1701, Order in Council, but the crown law officers 
advised that restitution thereunder could not be made without further proceedings 
433 Allegations of contemptuous frustration of an Order in Council 
in Lillington v. Regina from Barbados proved unfounded upon conciliar 
hearing. 434 But in several other Barbados appeals supplementary conciliar 
orders were necessary to overcome delay in execution or erroneous interpreta- 
i29 PC 1/60/B-B 10. Cf. the statement by 
Thomas Hutchinson in April, 1766, that the 
Chief Justice of Rhode Island "supposes no 
act of Parliament can controul a law of that 
colony" (26 MS Mass. Archives [Hutchinson 
Carres., 1761-70], 228). 
431 MS Petitions to R.l. General Assembly, 
1772-75, #88. 
432 MS R.I. Sup. Ct. Jud. Judgment Boo\, 
1772-95, 104-5- 
433 2 APC, Col., #839. Cf. 6 ibid., #71: PC 
1/46. 
434 2 APC, Col, #1088. 
430 PC 2/118/141-48, 170.