that the province charter seemingly limited appeals to "any personall action wherein the matter in difference doth exceed the value of three hundred pounds sterling." 364 Leighton then successfully petitioned the King in Council for an appeal which was entered in July, 1735. 365 Upon hearing of the appeal in April, 1736, reversal of the judgments below and restitution was ordered with consent of the parties. Appellant was also to substitute for his former plea in bar one of not guilty and upon the general issue be at liberty to give any special matter in evidence. Evidence was to be reduced to writing and made part of the record, and an appeal to the King in Council was to be allowed to either party. 388 On September 18, 1736, William Bollan, counsel for Leighton, delivered the Order in Council to the Superior Court of Judicature sitting at Bristol on circuit to obtain execution thereof. After reading and entry on the records ordered, the court deferred further consideration until the York term. 367 At the June, 1737, York term, accordingly, the court upon consideration of the Order in Council was of the opinion that if Leighton expected any order from the court thereon he ought to take out a summons (scire facias was first entered, then deleted) from the clerk's office "returnable as other proofs" to notify respondent Frost to show cause why the order should not be complied with. Upon return of the summons and hearing, the court would be able to make such further order as to justice appertained. 368 But when counsel Bollan moved the court on June 22 for execution of the Order in Council and observance thereof and compliance thereto in all respects, the court retorted that the subject matter required most mature consideration and that it would advise thereon until its next sitting. 369 364 1 Acts and Res. Prov. Mass. Bay, 15. 365 PC 2/93/164, 180, 200, 217. Gulston had earlier complained inter alia that in suits brought by the landowners the juries were composed of similarly situated neighbors. Since appeals would not lie for judgments under suits would probably be kept under that figure, so that the local determinations would be final (CSP, Col., 1734, #327 i). But when this complaint was transmitted to Belcher by the Duke of Newcastle, the governor declared his inability "to stop the course of the law" (Davis, 3 Pub. Col. Soc. Mass., 252-53). See also 12 Journals H.R. Mass., 113—14, 120—21. see PC 2/93/421-25, 438. 367 Suffolk County Court Piles, #42,649, 42,968; MS Mass. Sup. Ct. ]ud. Minute Book (Bristol), 1736-38, Sept., 1736, term, entry #101. 308 MS Mass. Sup. Ct. ]ud. Minute Book. (York), 1736-47, June, 1737, term, after entry #65. This entry is deleted by vertical lines. A similar show cause order was employed in an earlier appeal. In Gookin v. Smith (PC 2/Br/i74) respondent presented the affirming Order in Council to the provincial council on Oct. 29, 1706. After it had been read, it was directed that the order be transmitted to the Superior Court at the next sitting and that it should govern itself accordingly (Suffolk County Court Files, #6,931 [11]). Smith made application accordingly, in November, 1706, to the Superior Court for execution of the judgment affirmed at the Council Board. The court ordered Gookin to show cause why execution should not be had. In December judgment was acknowledged satisfied (MS Mass. Sup. Ct. Jud. Judgment Book, 1700-1714, 192). But in Gilbert v. Branfill the dismissing Order in Council was merely read and recorded (ibid., 1721-25, 49). 369 Suffolk County Court Files, #43,968; MS Mass. Sup. Ct. Jud. Minute Book (York),