thereupon observed that the question arising on the appeals had undergone great litigation in Westminster Hall and had in different shapes received various determinations. Since the rule of law by which the appeals ought to be decided was not thoroughly settled, it was resolved for the sake of uniformity and certainty in a matter on which land titles might depend that a case should be made for the opinion of King's Bench. 339 However, King's Bench refused to entertain such a reference, thereby necessitating a feigned action of trespass there. 340 King's Bench gave judgment in 1770 that the devisee took according to the intent of the testator only an estate for life. 341 A writ of error was taken from this judgment to the Exchequer Chamber, where by a majority of the judges the judgment was reversed in 1772. 342 Further writ of error was taken to the House of Lords, but the parties reached a compromise, and the cause was non-prossed in May, 1777. 343 In June the solicitors attended the Committee, whereupon reversal of both judgments and entry of judgment for appellants was advised. On July 4 the litigation was terminated by the usual Order in Council. 344 There is scattered evidence that the Privy Council was not regarded as an impartial tribunal and that efforts were made to pack the Committee when certain causes came up for hearing. In 1701 Governor Bellomont of New York asked Secretary Vernon to do respondent in Tierens and Cruger v. Depeyster "all the just favour you thinke fit" at the Council Board, since the "right of the case is perfectly with him in my apprehension." 345 In the Rhode Island- King's Bench. I don't know it ever was done. King's Bench refused to receive a case from the Rolls but this will be sent by the King and Council. The resolution of this Board will be according to what opinion the King's Bench may give" (WO 1/404/55). The other Committee members present were the Lord President (Duke of Bedford), Lord Sandys, and Lord Grantham (PC 2/111/283). For the conciliar "cases" of the parties see Add. MS, 36,219/236-42. Some cryptic notes on the hearing by Charles Yorke are at ibid., 243. 339 PC 2/111/283-84. For the case stated for the opinion of King's Bench see Case of Perrin and Blal{e in the King's Bench, 1 Hargrave, Collectanea Juridica (1791), 284-86. 340 Perrin v. Blake (1 W. Blackstone, 672); Case of Perrin and Blaise Stated and Observed Upon, loc. cit., 377; Hodgson v. Ambrose (1 Douglas, 337, 344, note [English Reprint]); PC 2/121/71-88. 341 Perrin v. Blake (1 W. Blackstone, 672). For the arguments of counsel and the judicial opinions, see Case of Perrin and Blake in the King's Bench, loc. cit., 286-322. The judgment was severely criticized by Charles Fearne (see Essay on Contingent Remainders and Executory Devises [1844, 10th ed.], 154 et seq.), and Lord Mansfield was accused of having given an earlier opinion in 1747 contrary to that rendered by him in King's Bench (see Copies of Opinions Ascribed to Eminent Council on the Will . . . of Perrin v. Blake in Fearne, op. cit. [4th ed., 1791], Appendix). See also Hodgson v. Ambrose (1 Douglas, 337, 342); Van Grutten v. Foxwell (A. C. [1897], 658, 670); Holliday, Life of Mansfield (1797), 201 et seq.; i Evans, A General View of the Decisions of Lord Mansfield (a. d.), 348-51- 342 4 Burr. 2579. For judicial discussion in the Exchequer Chamber see Blackstone, Argument in the Exchequer Chamber on Giving Judgment in the Case of Perrin and Another Against Blake, 1 Hargrave, Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law of England (1787), 489- 510. 343 Holliday, op. cit., 208-9. 344 PC 2/121/71, 129. 345 CSP, Col., 1701, #7.