With but few law lords in attendance, some Committee reticence to decide 
important causes where the authorities were in conflict is understandable. In 
December, 1764, appeals were entered in Perrin v. Blake and Perrin v. Witter 
from affirming judgments (1758) of the Jamaica Court of Errors. 336 The 
question presented for adjudication by these appeals was whether one John 
Williams took an estate for life, or an estate tail under a devise to Williams 
for life, remainder to trustees during the life of Williams, remainder to the 
heirs of the body of Williams. Or more broadly, whether the interposition of 
trustees to preserve contingent remainders should vary the rule of Shelley's 
Case. In the Jamaica courts the rule was held not applicable. 337 When the 
appeals came on for argument before the Committee in 1765, Lord Mansfield 
(the only law lord present), after reviewing the authorities, declared his inclination 
to make a case for the opinion of King's Bench. 338 The Committee 
the Carolina Vice-Admiralty Court, is this 
notation: "The sentence reversed, Ld. Ch. J. 
dissenting. Mem. that ... in discourse he 
told me; he had a will to be of the opinion 
of the rest but thought, by the statute it was 
not in his power" {Rawlinson MS, A 270/47). 
In Vassall v. Fletcher, Chief Justice Willes and 
Sir George Lee were for entering into the 
merits of the appeal, but the majority of the 
Committee voted to reverse on procedural 
grounds. (Endorsement on Case of Respondent, 
p. 3; L.C., Law Div.). The method employed 
by the Committee in voting upon appeals was 
probably that established by the February 20, 
1627/8, regulatory Order in Council, i.e., "In 
voting of any cause, the lowest Councillor in 
place is to begin and speak first; and it is to 
be carried by most voices, because every Councillor 
hath equal vote there." Set forth in 
Selborne, Judicial Procedure in the Privy 
Council, 66; 1 Clarendon, State Papers, 35. 
336 PC 2/111/52. 
337 For a statement of the case see Case of 
Perrin and Blaise Stated and Observed Upon, 
3 Hargrave, Jurisconsult Exercitations (1813), 
372-77. Fifoot erroneously states that the 
Jamaica courts applied the rule in Shelley's 
Case. {Lord Mansfield [1936], 172). 
338 Notes on the statement of Mansfield read 
as follows: "The general point is, on devise of 
lands, Devise to A. Remainder to the Heirs of 
his Body, are Heirs general, if nothing then of 
the Estate be given to Heirs or Heir special, 
it is Estate for Life. Took rise from the feudal 
Policy. When you give an Estate for Life the 
Heirs take by Limitation, because if he comes 
in as a Purchaser, the End would have been 
defeated, it would have been a direct fraud. 
"The Rule being so as to Estates, the Rule 
is the same in a Trust as in a legal Estate. 
Where one takes an Estate for Life, the Heir 
takes by descent. 
"In 1755 came on before Lord Hardwicke, 
Chancellor Carter and Baldwin [Garth v. 
Baldwin, 2 Ves. Sen. 646?]. Devise to A for 
Life, then to the Heirs of his Body. He directed 
this Trust Estate to be made an Estate 
Tail. 
"In 1753 Lister and Lister [3 Keny. I], 
term of twenty years, to A for Life and his 
Heirs. No case to the contrary, except where 
for Life only. 
"Blackburn and Wellet [Blackborn v. 
Hewer Edgley, 1 P. Wms. 600?], as where 
to Trustees to preserve Contingent Remainders. 
Particular Rules of property should be adhered 
to. To the same Rules, there are Exceptions, 
where the reason of the Rule has ceased, or 
circumstances to take it out of the Rule, then 
it goes to the intent, as in Blackburn and 
Wellet the word only. There never can be 
different circumstances between legal Estate 
and Trust. Especially where the interest is 
the Rule, so past a doubt in Coulson and 
Coulson [2 Stra. 1125; 2 At\. 246]. 
"Bagshaw and Spencer [1 Ves. Sen. 142; 2 
4t\. 246, 570, 577] was a Trust Estate, differs 
with the determination of Coulson and Coulson. 
But with decency to it the determination 
was made on a distinction. A distinction there 
stronger than the case of Coulson and Coulson. 
In Sayer and Sayer [Sayer v. Masterman, 
Ambler 344?] other circumstances. Incline to 
make a case for the opinion of the Court of