an ultimate prerogative and expresses his pleasure in peremptory form. In the 
other case (where the cause is coram rege in Cancellario) the Chancellor exercises 
the royal prerogative of grace committed to him as a special trust, and 
because in his determination he speaks for the King he likewise employs the 
imperative form. Between the two, however, there is a substantial practical 
difference in effect, for, as we shall see in a moment, the Order in Council on 
appeal is implemented by nothing so sure and tough as the chancery process 
available in an in personam decree. The absence of this may be attributed to the 
effects of 16 Charles I, c. 10. In his opinion in Penn v. Baltimore, Lord Hardwicke 
speaks of this statute as a restraint upon the effective enforcement of 
conciliar decrees in personam within the realm. One may properly query 
whether, in view of then current credo respecting King's writs not running out 
of the realm, a real statutory obstacle did not also exist as to the overseas 
dominions. 
Let us now consider the procedural possibility of a rehearing before the 
Committee on newly discovered evidence or new allegations. Obviously the 
case in which an Order in Council had already issued upon the Committee 
report is distinguishable from the case of an unapproved report. In either case 
the possibility of rehearing was slight, except as previously noticed in cases of 
ex parte dismissal without hearing on the merits. 285 Although we have seen 
that rehearings were accepted procedure in seventeenth-century Channel 
Islands causes, only a few successful applications in these causes are found in 
the post-1696 period. 286 In a Jamaica Court of Errors appeal a rehearing upon 
new matter was petitioned for before issuance of the Order in Council, but 
upon the granted rehearing no change was made in the Committee report. 287 
285 See supra, p. 278. 
286 The petition for a rehearing in Nicole v. 
Pipon (before any Order in Council issued) 
was referred to the "usual committee" to consider 
and to hear petitioner on any new matter 
which might be alleged and report thereon to 
the Council Board. But upon Committee consideration 
the petitioner offered no new matter, 
so that there was no reason to alter the former 
report (PC 2/76/463, 479). In April, 1708, 
Michael de Gruchy of Jersey complained by 
doleance of a Feb. 21, 1707/8, sentence of the 
Royal Court. The doleance was sent to the 
Royal Court to answer and also referred to the 
Committee. The latter after a hearing was of 
the opinion to advise reversal. But before the 
report was made respondent petitioned the 
Committee, offering several things in the cause. 
The Committee, upon considering the petition, 
answer, and reply, and hearing counsel, advised 
allowance of an appeal and halt of all 
proceedings below until the appeal was heard 
(PC 2/82/55, 210, 220-21, 224). In Carey v. 
De Lisle a petition for a rehearing before the 
Committee (the Order in Council had already 
issued) or for a return to the Royal Court for 
trial on the merits was rejected (PC 2/86/415; 
PC 2/87/73). In de Carteret v. Dumaresq before 
the Committee report for reversal was 
acted upon by the Council Board respondent 
petitioned for a rehearing. Both solicitors were 
examined therein and consideration respited, 
but the Order in Council issued without further 
mention of a rehearing (PC 2/88/366, 489). 
But upon appellant's petition in Pipon v. Dumaresq 
for reconsideration of a Committee 
report before transmission to the King in Council 
and upon hearing both solicitors, a clause 
was added to the report (PC 2/92/95, 98, 
104). 
287 In Orby v. Long (1710/1) the Committee 
report on the appeal advised that the judg-