prosecutions as undue and illegal, and Lord Cornbury was ordered to direct 
the local Attorney General to consent to the reversing of the sentences against 
both appellants and all proceedings thereupon and to do whatever else might 
be requisite in law to reinstate appellants to their honor and property as if no 
such prosecution had taken place. 221 
When the Order in Council reached the province in May, 1703, by order of 
the Governor in Council a warrant was issued to the Attorney General to 
govern himself accordingly. 222 Bayard proposed legislative action as most 
proper for effectuation of the conciliar order, but Lord Cornbury was of the 
opinion that writ of error proceedings would best serve. To this proposal it 
was objected in Bayard's behalf that no Supreme Court sitting was close and 
that Bayard's death without reversal would be grievous to his family. Even if 
legislative action was obtained, a writ of error could still be brought. 223 Thereupon, 
by June, 1703, a bill for declaring the illegality of the proceedings against 
Bayard and Hutchins and for reversing and making null and void the 
judgments and all proceedings thereon had passed the province legislature 
and received Lord Cornbury's assent. 224 Nevertheless, in the following October, 
counsel for Bayard and Hutchins moved the Supreme Court to have the 
judgments reversed upon several errors brought by direction of the Queen in 
Council. The errors being read and allowed by the court and consented to by 
the Attorney General, it was ordered that the judgments be reversed. 225 Some 
objections were raised to the form of the legislative reversal, 226 and it was not 
archives, not in the Public Record Office in 
London. 
221 PC 2/79/295; CSP, Col., 1702-3, #224. 
Cf. the language of the Board of Trade writing 
to Lord Cornbury on January 26 that "the 
sentences against Col. Bayard and Alderman 
Hutchins are reversed" (ibid., #249). See also 
the enigmatic pro-Atwood statement that 
"when he [Atwood] came there, he found 
that Bayard, instead of petitioning Her Majesty 
for a pardon, or leave to bring a writ of 
error, had arraigned his judges, and would 
have one of them and the King's sollicitor, to 
answer as criminals; but his agent being put 
to show, that no writ of error would lye as, 
it apparently did, this appeal was dropt; and 
they procured the bringing before her Majesty 
in Council, the Lord Cornbury's reasons for 
suspending him, and four others of the Council 
at New York" (Case of William Atwood, Esq., 
312). 
222 _9 MS. Mins. N.Y. Council, 226. Popular 
interest in the outcome of the appeal is attested 
by publication of the Order in Council 
in broadside form (copy in Redmond-Livingston 
MSS). 
223 CSP, Col, 1702-3, #9°5- 
224 1 Col. Laws N.Y., 531. See also CSP, Col, 
1702-3, #709. 7 2 6> 835. 
225 MS Mins. N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jud., 1701-4, sub 
Oct. 16, 1703. 
226 when the Board of Trade sought his opinion 
on the act, Attorney General Northey 
found nothing therein contrary to law or justice 
or prejudicial to the royal prerogative; 
but since the record of the attainders was to 
be destroyed, persons who had acted innocently 
under order from superiors might be subjected 
to suits without any possibility of defense 
thereto. Therefore, an indemnity clause 
was felt desirable or the wronged persons 
should be required to declare under seal that 
they would not bring any such actions (CSP, 
Col., 1704-;, #545). Such fear was not idle, 
for Bayard and Hutchins had brought actions 
against the judges and the grand jury; see 
ibid., 1702-3, #419, 761; 4 Doc. Rel. Col. 
Hist. N.Y., 1032. The Board of Trade then