the demise of a party or parties appellant or respondent during the pendency 
of an appeal, it was necessary to petition or move for a revival of such appeal. 
Usually such revival was granted pro forma." Seemingly, it was necessary to 
serve respondents with the order of revival. 48 The question also arose whether 
a court below could revive a cause after an appeal was taken. 49 
One of the few procedural snares was the necessity of adversarial notice on 
virtually all Committee hearings and motions. 50 The conspicuous exception 
to this requirement was in the case of doleances or petitions for leave to appeal 
where the hearing was usually ex parte? 1 As has been seen earlier, such hearings 
were obviously open to misrepresentation, 62 although some safeguard was 
available in insistence upon transmission of the proceedings below under 
47 But see Seawell v. Seawell where an appeal 
was held absolutely abated by appellant's 
death (PC 2/90/216-18, 227-30). 
48 See the deposition of service in Barrell v. 
Stoddard, April 30, 1734 (Suffolk, County 
Court Files, #35,686). 
49 In Adams v. Sturge an appeal was taken 
from a July 7, 1755, Barbados chancery order 
whereby an unprosecuted appeal granted to 
one John Gibbons, deceased, from a Dec. 2, 
1737, chancery order was revived against appellant. 
The petition and appeal also prayed 
that respondent should not be allowed to 
appeal at the present date and that the former 
appeal be dismissed with exemplary costs for 
nonprosecution (PC 2/105/158). Respondent 
in turn petitioned that in case the chancery 
order of July 7, 1755, should be found irregular, 
that the appeal granted Gibbons 
might be revived by conciliar order (PC 2/ 
105/541). In his conciliar case appellant 
argued that the July 9, 1755, order was the 
first instance of any court of justice assuming 
to itself power to revive an appeal once 
made and depending before the King in 
Council. "From the moment that the party 
aggrieved has prayed liberty to appeal, the 
inferior court, if leave be asked in due time, 
is bound to grant it, ex debito justitiae; and 
can take no cognizance of matters relative to 
the prosecution of that appeal. It is the constant 
established practice, upon the death of 
an appellant, to petition for a revivor in 
Council, and in some cases it may be matter 
of judgment, whether it shall be allowed or 
not; and who may be proper parties to it." 
Appellant further asserted that by the governor's 
instructions it was commanded that 
no appeal be allowed unless prayed at the 
time of the decree or within fourteen days 
thereafter. "But if judges in the plantations 
can revive an appeal, in cases, where they 
cannot receive an original appeal; and, this, 
by virtue of their own authority, the salutary 
purpose of those instructions, to promote dispatch, 
and to prevent vexation, will frequently 
be evaded" (Case of Appellant, Add. MS, 
36,217/172; L.C., Law Div.). Upon hearing, 
the Committee advised reversal of the July 9, 
1755, chancery order (PC 2/105/554), and 
dismissal of both respondent's petition and the 
appeal granted from the Dec. 2, 1737, chancery 
decree (PC 2/106/46). 
50 See Angus v. Quiliin (PC 2/112/103, PC 
1/8 [41]); Pipon v. Le Febvre; over forty 
days' notice held insufficient, although usual 
Jersey period of notice was forty (PC 2/86/ 
134). But cf. Rex v. Tapin where by consent 
of the parties the usual summons for hearing 
was waived (PC 2/86/135). A hearing might 
be expedited by requiring notice only to a 
party's London solicitor (Seale v. Pipon, PC 
2/86/287; Le Couteur v. Pipon, PC 2/86/ 
461). For a specimen deposition of service of 
notice see that in Macarell v. Parkes (PC 
1/58-B/B1). 
51 For adoption of the term "doleance" in 
colonial and conciliar practice, see Taylor v. 
Clarke (PC 2/101/364, 396); Powell v. 
Hughes (Case of Respondent, p. 7, Add. MS, 
36,217/48); Lidderdale v. Chiswell (Case of 
Respondent, ibid., 201); Foster v. Dupouy 
(Case of Respondent, p. 8, ibid., 216); Grant 
v. Newton (Case of Appellant, Add. MS, 
36,218/82). 
52 See the representation of the Lieutenant- 
Governor and Council of Virginia in Randolph 
v. Beverley (PC 2/98/278-79). Cf. the intimation 
of the New York agent upon the 
ex parte admission of the appeal in Cunningham 
v. Forsey (Chalmers MSS, 4 New York, 
20).