followed the routine succession of Committee reference, peremptory order for 
hearing (in some cases), hearing, report, and Order in Council. 3T Less frequently 
found is the more direct procedure of a motion before the Committee 
for such dismissal. 38 In either case it would appear that the appellant had to 
receive adequate notice. 39 Since the Committee discouraged strict interpretation 
of the temporal limitation for prosecution of appeals, in several instances 
hearings on the merits were granted after a previous report advising dismissal 
for nonprosecution. 40 Obviously, valid reasons for the delay in prosecution 
were necessary to such procedure. Another ground for dismissal of an appeal 
without a hearing upon the merits was failure to post the requisite security. 41 
In a small number of causes appellants were allowed to withdraw their appeals, 
in some instances being penalized with costs. 42 In other cases petitions 
of appeal were allowed to be amended by Committee order. 43 
In a small number of causes cross-appeals were entered, 44 the procedure on 
cross-appeal following closely that of the main appeal. 45 Usually both the main 
and cross-appeals were heard at the same Committee sitting. 46 In the event of 
no application could be made to dismiss an 
appeal which was not entered in the Council 
register and therefore not brought before the 
Committee {Add. MS, 36,218/212). 
37 More reluctance was shown to order dismissal 
without furdier opportunity for a hearing 
when the appeal had been entered at the 
Council Board. See Styles v. Kirkbride (PC 
2/117/351; PC 2/119/32); Bennett v. Gardiner 
(PC 2/119/308, 392); Francia v. Hope 
(PC 2/104/444). 
38 See Nelson v. Beale (PC 2/94/240, 242, 
244). 
39 See Crow v. Ramsey (PC 2/81/282, 284, 
337, 348); cf. Cockrane v. Powell (PC 2/77/ 
353, 362). 
40 Brenton v. Boreland (PC 2/92/184, 196, 
456, 496, 519); Rennald v. Brooke (PC 2/100/ 
568, 624; PC 2/101/30); Boutin v. Innes (PC 
2/103/328, 346; PC 2/104/175. 205, 276; PC 
2/105/49, 85); Mathison v. Taylor, by consent 
of the parties (PC 2/116/68, 74, 511; PC 2/ 
117/374, 394); Beck v. Halsey, by consent of 
the parties (PC 2/126/89, 127, 180, 324, 348); 
MacNamara v. Brooke, agreement of parties 
(PC 2/91/296). Cf. Hiscutt v. Divarris, where 
such procedure was denied (PC 2/127/96, 215, 
231). 
41 Ashley v. Applewhaite (PC 2/96/110, 116). 
42 De Paz v. Gabay (PC 2/91/191, 214); Mills 
v. Ottley (PC 2/103/244, 262; appellant allowed 
to withdraw petition and appeal on payment 
of £ 5 sterling costs where special verdict 
below was defective); Bayly v. Gale (PC 2/ 
107/215, 217; the Committee indicated that 
withdrawal without costs was conditioned by 
the nonappearance of the respondent); Perrin 
v. Blechynden (PC 2/108/420, 427; without 
costs); Perrin v. Malcher (PC 2/109/299, 324; 
appellant was advised that his appeal was improper; 
no costs taxed); Maynard v. Stone (PC 
2/109/120, 170; appellant was advised that his 
chancery bill was improperly drawn; no costs); 
Van Teylingen v. Severin (PC 2/114/409, 
419). Cf. Heywood v. Lewn, (PC 2/115/356, 
365 [Isle of Man]). 
43 See Thibou v. Pierce (PC 2/91/179-80); 
Colebrook v. Rex (PC 2/91/467); Garbrand 
v. Strachan (PC 2/93/84-85); Peters v. 
Bourke (PC 2/109/187); Cross v. Davis (PC 
2/108/418); Jones v. Hall (PC 2/116/119- 
20). Cf. Francis v. Jeffries where an amendment 
to a petition for leave to appeal was 
allowed (PC 2/97/130-31). 
44 Cross-appellants were also required to give 
the usual security; see Estridge v. Tittle (PC 
2/94/45> 56)- 
45 See Crump v. Morris (PC 2/94/21, 164, 
210); Charnock v. Saer (PC 2/94/371, 527, 
558; PC 2/95/45, Io s> M 4); Palmer v. Sealy 
(PC 2/96/104, 218, 247, 248, 261); Hamilton 
v. Richardson (PC 2/98/316; PC 2/101/168, 
179, 217); de Rotalde v. Ord (PC 2/116/510; 
PC 2/117/95, 380, 392). 
40 But in Stone v. Spragge decision on the 
cross-appeal was reserved for six months (PC 
2/115/327, 342)-