when discretion resided in the governor. 14 In contrast with these stringent requirements was the policy of the Council Board to require only sterling as the usual security—one-fifth of the appealable minimum in many cases. 15 This liberality might afford relief against the harsh conditions of colonial acts or courts, 16 or even be extended by conciliar order to the case where security was to be given below. 17 In a few cases the Council demanded a higher or lower amount than the norm; 18 in case of extreme poverty, security might even be waived. 18 It should be noted that some disadvantage resided in low security in that conciliar costs might be limited by the amount of security 20 But, then, in few appeals was more than costs awarded. 21 Apparently the appeal was next set down for. hearing on a list of council causes maintained at the Council Office and, in many cases, heard without further application visible in the Council register. We have seen no trace of such docket of conciliar causes in the Privy Council registers and papers still preserved, 22 but we do find register entries wherein the Committee ordered the sequence in which a group of pending appeals was to be heard. 23 In most appeals one or more motions before the Committee were necessary to bring on a cause for a hearing. Proof had to be made that all respondents had been summoned before a day would be appointed for a hearing. 24 But judging from the Council register, entry of an appearance by respondent was neither necessary nor usual, although in some instances it might be advantageous. 25 Ap- "who can venture upon such a security here at ye hazard of suffering his estate to be levied upon for that sum in case S 's judgment should be confirmed upon the appeal" (Add. MS, 41,346/38). "See CSP, Col., 1701, #876. 13 PC 2/88/538; PC 2/89/330; PC 2/92/119, 134; PC 2/102/491. C/. the statement of Pound (Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases [1941], 67) that "no recognizances were taken by the reviewing tribunal." 10 PC 2/88/357, 480, 538; Mansfield v. Concannen here; PC 2/97/248-49); Broome v. Eyles (PC 2/95/no-n). 17 Pierce v. Rice (PC 2/102/491 [Rhode Island]). Cf. Paine v. Dewitt, where appellant was to give security in the same amount that previously had been refused below (PC 2/ 90/185). 18 Cowes v. Sharpe, £500 (PC 2/78/187-88); Allen v. Waldron, (PC 2/78/285-86); Chilton v. Regina, £500 (PC 2/81/34-35); Connecticut v. Mohegan Indians, £400 (PC 2/81/202); Barrow v. Regina, /50 (PC 2/ 81/410-n); Briscoe v. Hodgings, .£2OO (PC 2/81/409-10); Macarell v. Penn, £500 (PC 2/84/268-69); Peers v. Barwick, £200 (PC 2/84/191-92). 19 Lyons v. Lyons (PC 2/89/354-55) 20 In Lovegrove v. Binney the appeal was dismissed with j£ioo costs or the full amount of the recognizance, if under the value of £100 (PC 2/128/252). 21 See infra, p. 318 et seq. 22 A solicitor in Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut made mention thereof in 1769 (MS Conn. Archives, 2 Indians 279 a). Through the courtesy of Lord Wright of Durley the opportunity was afforded for further search among the records remaining at the Privy Council Office in Downing Street. Unfortunately no records for this period were found. 23 PC 2/93/84, 90, 506; PC 2/96/174; PC 2/97/210; PC 2/103/161. 24 See Philips v. Savage (PC 2/94/203). 25 In Potter v. Freeborn, respondent's motion that a day be appointed for hearing the appeal was made conditional upon entry of an appearance for one of the respondents (PC 2/103/155). In Cross v. Davis entry of an appeal from a 1747 chancery decree was allowed in 1760, since respondent had not