peal before the lapse of this time. 7 In some cases colonial statutes 8 or practice 9 
extended the period to eighteen months, but apparently a shortened interval 
would not be countenanced. 10 However, the year or year-and-a-day period 
was not Procrustean; conciliar practice usually extended it. 11 
We have seen in our discussion of regulations of the appellate process that 
in many cases the security given by appellant was double the judgment sum. 12 
This was an onerous burden in some cases, 13 but perhaps less grievous than 
practice that security be given to prosecute 
the appeal to effect within a year and a day 
(Case of the Respondent, Sedden v. Christian, 
Add. MS, 36,216/87). Cf. the meaning of 
"effectually prosecute" in Isle of Man appeals, 
supra, p. 269. 
7 J. Yeamans, agent for Antigua, seeking to 
delay the hearing of a complaint, said that 
it would still be heard within nine months of 
presentation, "which will be three sooner than 
any appellant from this very island can bring 
on an appeal if the respondent does not appear 
sooner, every respondent having by the 
course of the Council Board a year and a day 
before he can be compelled to appear to any 
appeal" {PC 1/49); cf. 6 APC, Col., #450- 
In Jones v. Porter (Va.) respondent alleged 
that appellant, as soon as the year had expired 
for presenting petitions to the King in Council 
in such cases, obtained an order for a summons 
to be hung upon the Royal Exchange for 
hearing the appeal (Case of Respondent, p. 4; 
L.C., Law Div.). 
8 See supra, p. 249. 
9 On May 12, 1705, appellant in Gookin v. 
Smith, a Massachusetts appeal, gave a bond 
in £1,400 current silver money of New England 
to prosecute within eighteen months of 
date and to pay all costs and damages in case 
of affirmance {Suffolk County Court Files, 
#6451). 
10 The appeal of Andrew Cassally from a 1717 
Barbados sentence was dismissed, but it was 
ordered that the security given to prosecute 
the appeal within six months be discharged, 
inasmuch as a longer time should have been 
given, as was usual in appeals {PC 2/86/167, 
171). 
11 An extreme instance is afforded in Cross v. 
Atkins where appellant petitioned in May, 
1760, that an appeal taken from a January 23, 
1747/8, Jamaica chancery decree be received, 
although out of the usual time. Upon consideration 
thereof the Committee found that 
respondent had entered no appearance or made 
application for dismissal for nonprosecution. 
Therefore, it was ordered that the appeal be 
allowed to be entered, saving respondent the 
right to object at the hearing to the length of 
time the appeal was neglected {PC 2/107/367, 
398, 402; Add. MS, 36,218/209). When the 
appeal was heard, this objection proved futile, 
for the decree was reversed, and respondent's 
bill was dismissed {PC 2/110/186, 194). In 
Jones v. Shields, a Virginia appeal from an 
October, 1751, decree, respondent petitioned 
in January, 1753, for dismissal for nonprosecution. 
But the Committee was of the opinion 
that it was too soon to dismiss the appeal, 
since the time for prosecution of appeals from 
the plantations was not elapsed above three 
months {PC 2/103/298, 301). For other late 
appeal entrances see Stewart v. Battyn {PC 
2/85/154), 16 months; Forrest v. Martin 
{PC 2/87/260), 23 months; Parke v. Gilbert 
{PC 2/88/178) where in the petition presented 
on January 19, 1722/3, appellant prayed a hearing 
on an appeal from an August, 1721, decree 
even though it was four months beyond the 
time allowed for an appeal; Ball v. Heal 
{PC 2/90/436), 22 months; Dunbar v. Glanville 
{PC 2/91/248), 4 years; Nelson v. Beale 
{PC 2/91/248), 16 months; Hunt v. Hill {PC 
2/94/370), 21 months; Kelly v. Butler {PC 2/ 
97/73)> 2 years; Wilkinson v. Mendez {PC 
2/100/548), 2 years; Bayer v. Warner {PC 2/ 
102/432), 2 years. 
12 See supra, p. 245 et seq. But cf. the statement 
in the MS General Method of Obtaining 
Appeals to His Majesty in Council (c. 1765) 
that "the party appealing enters into a bond in 
two sureties to the other party in the cause in 
the penalty of £200 conditioned to prosecute 
the said appeal with effect within one year and 
a day from the date thereof or in default to 
pay the costs and damages sustained thereby" 
{Add. MS, 35,914/189). 
13 See Chester v. Royal African Co. {PC 2/ 
86/187), where the amount in controversy 
was £20,000. Even where only £2,000 
would be demanded as security, we find 
Samuel Martin of Antigua asking in 1752,