The continuing force of the sixteenth-century appellate regulations for the 
Channel Islands was still evident during the period under consideration. 
Criminal appeals from Guernsey were still barred by virtue of the October 9, 
1580, Order in Council, 319 although the similar ban in claims of haro failed of 
observance. 320 Appeals from Jersey in criminal causes were also barred, 321 
presumably upon the authority of the Ordinances of Pine and Napper. 322 The 
greater part of the May 13,1572, regulation for Jersey, plus the later regulations, 
was incorporated in the 1771 Jersey Code, which received royal approbation 
323 To the previous regulations in Guernsey further contribution was 
made by ordinances in 1717, 1719, 1731, and 1732. 324 
It is difficult to utter many words of praise for the composition and administration 
of the royal instructions during the eighteenth century. The rigid 
adherence of the Board of Trade to existing provisions in the face of colonial 
demands for alteration had an atrophying effect upon the jurisdiction of the 
Privy Council and of the respective Governors and Councils. For in the case 
of strict compliance there can be little doubt that the instructions exerted an 
inhibitory force upon these jurisdictions. New York, where evidence is available 
that the instructions were strictly adhered to, may be cited as an example 
of the blighting effect of the instructions upon the appellate process, and New 
Jersey should probably be placed in the same category. Conjecture becomes certainty 
in the case of the Carolinas as royal provinces. The number of conciliar 
appeals taken from all these colonies scarcely compares with the flow from 
Rhode Island, which enjoyed an appeal minimum materially lower than that 
319 See Andros v. Le Marchant (PC 2/89/144, 
220). 
320 See Bowden v. Le Marchant (PC 2/85/ 
224; PC 2/86/158, 169); Perchard v. Le 
Messurier (PC 2/91/416; PC 2/92/500, 520); 
Perchard v. Tupper (PC 2/91/417; PC 2/92/ 
5 01 , 519); Perchard v. Dobree (PC 2/95/124; 
PC 2/104/437, 457). 
321 See Le Cousteur v. Dumaresq (PC 2/81/ 
545). In 1709 it was complained against the 
Royal Court that "ils donnent ordinairement 
le nom de criminelles aux actions qu'un 
poursuit clans leur cour pour des trangressions, 
calomnies, ou autres fautes de telle nature, 
afin que par la ils se puissent fournir un 
pretexte de ne point permettre d'appeaux aux 
parties grevees, encores qu'ils endicident euxmemes 
sans enqueste et quoy qu'ils n'ayent 
aucune loy pour cela. Autrefois le baillif et 
jurez donnaient de tels appeaux de cours" 
(Recueil de quelques griefs publics des habitants 
de L'isle de Jersey [London, 1709] 6-7 
[Soc. Jer. Lib.]). Sec also the accusation in 
The Tyranny of the Magistrates of Jersey 
(London, 1772), 32-33, that the Royal Court 
converted personal actions into criminal offenses, 
for the sake of augmenting fines and 
preventing appeals to the King in Council. 
As in Guernsey, appeals in claims of haro 
were admitted; see Seale v. Pipon (PC 2/82/ 
118, 487, 510, 518); Durell v. Pipon (PC 
2/82/169, 173; PC 2/83/121, 130); Dumaresq 
v. de la Cloche (PC 2/85/327; PC 
2/86/52, 71). But there was no restriction on 
Jersey appeals in this class of cases. 
322 See Sections 2 and 4 set out in Respondent's 
brief in Renouf v. Attorney General for 
Jersey, Appendix I, #28. Cf. Saflord and 
Wheeler, Practice Privy Council in Judicial 
Matters, 238-39. 
823 Code of Laws for the Island of Jersey 
(1771), 168-70; Safford and Wheeler, op. cit., 
223. 
324 Recueil d'Ordonnances de la cour royale 
de ITsle de Guernesey (1852), 234, 240, 260, 
262.