governed, but variants of civil law rules are found in Massachusetts 292 and in 
North Carolina 293 in appeals to the High Court of Admiralty. With the then 
prevailing confusion over the proper locus of appeal we think it probable that 
appeals to the King in Council would be governed by the same regulations 
as would apply if a cause were taken to the High Court of Admiralty. A writer 
who claims familiarity with admiralty practice has recently set forth a version 
of appeals in vice-admiralty causes, the purport of which is that a general 
regulation existed throughout the colonial period and in all dominions overseas 
294 No part of this writer's statement is supported by citation, but it is 
apparent from the text set forth below that it is a mere professorial concoction 
from ingredients supplied out of governors' instructions, statutory provisions 
(6 Anne, c. 37, s. 8) and colonial admiralty practice. We find it difficult to 
believe that there ever existed regulation by such a hodgepodge, and an examination 
of all the known vice-admiralty court records of the thirteen colonies, 
as well as a considerable bulk of lawyers' papers, has failed to yield a trace 
of any such general rule. On the contrary, as late as 1719/20 Jeremiah Dummer, 
whom no one could accuse of being uninformed, in a letter regarding an appeal 
to the High Court of Admiralty from a New York Vice-Admiralty Court 
sentence remarked: 
I find by discourse with the Doctors that it's like to prove an expensive and dilatory 
business, because the method of prosecuting these appeals is not under any certain 
regulation as those before the King in Council are. They even say that if people are 
refractory of your side the water, they can't be compelled to answer here. 295 
Soon afterward Dummer again wrote that a proctor "tells me that without 
some Parliamentary regulation of appeals from the plantations to the Court 
of Admiralty here there's no bringing them on unless where the partyes are 
both willing." 296 
In the absence of any proof of general regulation, we are constrained to believe 
that there is no general answer to the question proposed above and that 
292 In this colony bonds were ordered given 
within fifteen days after sentence to pay treble 
costs in case of affirmance or nonprosecution 
cum effectu within a year of sentence (MS 
Mass. Ct. Adm. Rec, 1718-26, 22, 30, 92, 
167). These regulations were severer for appellant 
than the instructions, but treble costs 
might be "chancered." See Oulton v. Waldo 
where treble costs amounted to £ 86/8 sterling, 
but Judge Menzies restricted, modified, 
and taxed costs at ,£3l sterling (ibid., in), 
and the fifteen day clause was disregarded 
(ibid., 167). 
293 In this colony only ten months was allowed 
for prosecution, but seemingly no treble costs 
were awarded. Clark qui tarn v. Success (2 MS 
Mini. No. Car. Vice-Aim. Ct., 1739-46, 67-68, 
80, 109-10). 
294 See Andrews in Rec. Vice-Adm. Ct. R. 1., 
23-24. 
296 MS Conn. Archives, 2 Foreign Corns., 
#110. This document is cited by Andrews, 
op. cit. 24, note, on another point. If Mr. 
Andrews actually read the whole letter, it is 
curious that he could make without qualification 
the statement above (n. 294). 
298 MS Conn. Archives, 2 Foreign Corres., 
#114.